

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 18 Feb 2000	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Bringing About a Military Learning Organization the US Army in the Philippine War, 1899-1902.			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Maj Madelfia A. Abb, USA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) see attached				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 80	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	

20001108 040

ABSTRACT

BRINGING ABOUT A MILITARY LEARNING ORGANIZATION: THE US ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902 by Major Madelfia A. Abb, US Army, 79 pages.

Through learning and enhanced capacity to learn faster than its adversaries, a military organization increases its chances for success within an increasing complex and chaotic environment. The complex and chaotic nature of military conflicts requires a reliable strategy for success. Based on systems theory, non-linearity, and chaos, the concept of learning organization confronts the complexity of military operations with great efficiency and effectiveness.

This monograph recommends the key to surviving and prospering within the spectrum of military operations is to internalize and practice the five learning disciplines. Dr. Peter Senge introduces in his book The Fifth Discipline, five learning disciplines known as the discipline of systems thinking, personal mastery, shared vision, mental models, and team learning. From Dr. Senge's concept of learning organization, this study proposes that the internalization and practice of these disciplines by a military organization facilitates the bringing about a military learning organization. A military learning organization is an organization composed of people who are able to enhance their capacity to learn and create a desired result. To merely adapt in a military conflict is not enough to achieve success. A military organization must both achieve adaptive and generative learning to survive and prosper in a complex and chaotic military operations. Adaptive and generative learning are achieved through the internalization and practice of the five learning disciplines. By presenting learning organization concept as the key to military success, this study examines the influential effects of the five disciplines on military outcomes using a historical example.

The monograph uses the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to illustrate the effects of the five disciplines when internalized and practiced. This case study argues that adaptive and generative learning resulting from the effects of the five discipline increased the potential for success within a highly complex and chaotic nature of conventional, unconventional, and support and stability operations (SASO) spectrum of military operations. Using the five learning disciplines as an analytical framework, a cognitive explanation to how the American-Philippine Expeditionary Force (APEF) accomplished its mission of pacifying the Philippines. An analysis of the APEF's experience reveals a struggle to bring about a military learning organization. It was a struggle that ended in success due to the harmonious interplay of the five learning disciplines manifested in the thinking and interactions of individuals and the APEF organization.

The study concludes that a military learning organization is the key to achieving desired outcomes in all spectrums of military operations in the 21st century. A military learning organization, once realized, is able to create the outcomes it truly desires.

**Bringing About A Military Learning Organization:
The US Army in the Philippine War, 1899-1902**

**A Monograph
By
Major Madelfia A. Abb
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 99-00

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Madelfia A. Abb,
Military Intelligence, US Army

**Title of Monograph: Bringing About A Military Learning Organization:
The US Army in the Philippine War, 1899-1902**

Approved by:

Dr. Robert Epstein **Monograph Director**

COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS **Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies**

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. **Director, Graduate Degree
Program**

Accepted this 18th day of February 2000

ABSTRACT

BRINGING ABOUT A MILITARY LEARNING ORGANIZATION: THE US ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902 by Major Madelfia A. Abb, US Army, 79 pages.

Through learning and enhanced capacity to learn faster than its adversaries, a military organization increases its chances for success within an increasing complex and chaotic environment. The complex and chaotic nature of military conflicts requires a reliable strategy for success. Based on systems theory, non-linearity, and chaos, the concept of learning organization confronts the complexity of military operations with great efficiency and effectiveness.

This monograph recommends the key to surviving and prospering within the spectrum of military operations is to internalize and practice the five learning disciplines. Dr. Peter Senge introduces in his book The Fifth Discipline, five learning disciplines known as the discipline of systems thinking, personal mastery, shared vision, mental models, and team learning. From Dr. Senge's concept of learning organization, this study proposes that the internalization and practice of these disciplines by a military organization facilitates the bringing about a military learning organization. A military learning organization is an organization composed of people who are able to enhance their capacity to learn and create a desired result. To merely adapt in a military conflict is not enough to achieve success. A military organization must both achieve adaptive and generative learning to survive and prosper in a complex and chaotic military operations. Adaptive and generative learning are achieved through the internalization and practice of the five learning disciplines. By presenting learning organization concept as the key to military success, this study examines the influential effects of the five disciplines on military outcomes using a historical example.

The monograph uses the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to illustrate the effects of the five disciplines when internalized and practiced. This case study argues that adaptive and generative learning resulting from the effects of the five discipline increased the potential for success within a highly complex and chaotic nature of conventional, unconventional, and support and stability operations (SASO) spectrum of military operations. Using the five learning disciplines as an analytical framework, a cognitive explanation to how the American-Philippine Expeditionary Force (APEF) accomplished its mission of pacifying the Philippines. An analysis of the APEF's experience reveals a struggle to bring about a military learning organization. It was a struggle that ended in success due to the harmonious interplay of the five learning disciplines manifested in the thinking and interactions of individuals and the APEF organization.

The study concludes that a military learning organization is the key to achieving desired outcomes in all spectrums of military operations in the 21st century. A military learning organization, once realized, is able to create the outcomes it truly desires.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.....	1
II. Emergence of Learning Organization.....	6
The Fifth Discipline.....	8
An Emerging vision-- A Military Learning Organization.....	12
III. The Philippine War, 1899-1902.....	16
Lacking Visions.....	17
High Degree of Personal Mastery.....	21
Flawed Mental Models.....	23
Lack of Systems Thinking.....	25
The Chaotic Aspect of the Philippine War.....	28
IV. The Pacification: Achieving Generative Learning with the Fifth Discipline.....	31
A Systems Analysis.....	32
Achieving Adaptive Learning with Major General's Merritt and Otis.....	37
Achieving Generative Learning with Major General MacArthur.....	42
V. Implications of the Fifth Discipline to Future Military Operations.....	48
In Search of a Military Learning Organization.....	53
Appendix I: Timeline of Events During the Philippine-American War.....	69
Appendix II: Bibliography.....	72

themselves and the environment, create the chaotic nature of military operations.⁶ One of those systems is the thinking enemy. Military power applied against a learning enemy may not always proportionally produce the desired outcome since the enemy, too, responds in a non-linear manner. Far different from the problems of customer satisfaction, bottom line and supply and demand, the problem of compelling an enemy to do one's will through direct and indirect application of military power in terms of time, space, combat power, and purpose requires a non-linear and systems approach.⁷ Developing non-linear and systems based methods to compel the enemy to do one's will comes from developing an understanding of the human and physical dimensions of military environment.⁸ As the learning organization concept suggests, the key to success is to individually and collectively increase the knowledge and developmental understanding. In doing so, innovative and creative thinking and interaction facilitate the development of potent courses of actions against an enemy where the enemy has no recourse but to subjugate itself. In essence, learning and learning quickly during a military operation are vital.

Peter Senge, a leading scholar in the learning organization concept and author of *The Fifth Discipline* and *The Dance of Change*, expands on the traditional meaning of learning from the past. Military history provides proof that catastrophic military misfortunes occur when forces fail to *learn*, adapt, and anticipate.⁹ Many scholars and historians define the concept of "failure to learn" to mean failure to assimilate and incorporate lessons of the past. Senge, however, adds another perspective to the definition. He suggests, *real learning* allows an organization to both *survive* and *prosper* in a complex and chaotic world.¹⁰ He argues, *adaptive learning*, or to merely learn from

Introduction

The organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations that discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization. Something like a learning organization.

Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline¹

Amidst the complex and chaotic nature of the world, the concept of the learning organization emerges as the fundamental core of the strategy for success. Learning organizations are “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.”² Primarily developed in the field of business management, practitioners of the concept believe corporations need to increase their capacity to learn in order to *survive* and *prosper* in a globally competitive business environment- an environment consisting of continual and fast paced rate of change, rapid technological advances, massive societal change, and increasing competition.³ The heart of the concept is the very idea of *learning* in a very complicated and dynamic environment. Simply put, learning faster than its competitors or adversaries, an organization increases its chances for success within an increasing complex and chaotic environment. The military world confronts an equally, if not more, complex and chaotic environment than the business world.⁴ Similarly, like corporations, a military organization increases its chances for success if it relies on learning and enhances its capacity to learn rapidly.

Success in complex and chaotic military operations requires learning.⁵ Military operations and the environment in which they occur all have elements of unique, dynamic, and unpredictable interactions among various systems. Complex, interrelated systems, and the numerous unpredictable behavior or responses of these systems between

past experience and adapt to changing conditions, only allows an organization to *survive*. *Generative learning* must complement *adaptive learning* in order for an organization to *prosper*.¹¹ Generative learning is what allows an organization to exploit lessons and develop processes or systems leading to the attainment of desired results. Such learning generates an increased capacity to respond spontaneously, overcoming unpredictable and unforeseen events. Generative learning and adaptive learning are fundamental elements to Senge's learning organization concept.

Applying Senge's learning concepts and ideas into the military realm offers a promising and insightful prospective. The application of the concept brings forth the notion that to survive in war and achieve prosperity of success and victory an armed force needs to transform into something like a military learning organization (MLO). The term MLO serves to mold and convert a business-based concept of learning organization into the world of the military. For an armed force to be a MLO, it needs to manifest *real learning* in its abilities to survive and prosper in order to create the results it truly desires and accomplish missions.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (1 August 1994), states the U.S. Army must continually seek to operate as a learning organization. By desiring to be a learning organization, the U.S. Army recognizes that through learning it can cope with and manipulate the dynamics of war or stability and support operations (SASO).¹² However, the U.S. Army has not elaborated on what it truly means to practice the art of a learning organization within the military realm, nor has it established a doctrine on how to bring about a military learning

organization. Yet, unknowingly, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 has set the stage for the vision of a military learning organization to emerge.

To bring about military learning organization, the U.S. Army needs to truly internalize and practice, at the individual and collective levels, the five disciplines. The disciplines of systems thinking, personal mastery, shared vision, mental models, and team learning are the intangible and cognitive aspects which together make up the heart and soul of a military learning organization. They are the skills for learning and enablers for fast learning. These five disciplines help create the state, condition, or climate of a military learning organization. The effects of internalizing disciplines manifest themselves in each member and the organization's thinking and interaction leading toward the desired outcome of mission accomplishment.

The first people who must internalize and practice the five disciplines are the leaders. Creating an environment for learning and fast learning requires a certain type of leadership. Leadership, in a learning organization, is the ability to implement and sustain change within an organization.¹³ Combining this definition with the U.S. Army's definition of leadership--that being the ability to influence behavior-- generates an added dimension to leading in a military learning organization.¹⁴ In this type of organization, a leader must be able to integrate changes and influence its subordinates' behavior toward accepting, working, and exploiting changes. Within the three levels of leadership Senge describes in his book, *The Dance of Change*, he argues the executive leaders have the vital responsibility of creating "an organizational environment for continual innovation and knowledge generation."¹⁵ This organizational environment is synonymous to what is known in the military as command climate. In order for an American force to bring

about a military learning organization, it requires a command climate that allows the effects of the five disciplines to manifest throughout the organization and facilitate fast learning.

“American forces have shown themselves to be extraordinarily fast learners” in the past.¹⁶ As this study will demonstrate, the American-Philippine Expeditionary Force’s (APEF) experience in pacifying the Philippines from 1898 to 1902 represents a most telling struggle to bring about a military learning organization. It was a struggle to learn and to learn fast. In its first venture in international military intervention and implementation of American imperial policy, the APEF was challenged by the Filipino revolutionaries who did not welcome American sovereignty and sought independence through war.¹⁷ Learning and learning fast depended on the level of internalization of the five learning disciplines by the leaders and subordinates of the APEF. It took the APEF four years to *survive* through various spectrums of military operations and to *prosper* by achieving Philippine pacification in 1902.

This monograph suggests bringing about a military learning organization through the internalization and practice of the five disciplines can lead to desired military outcomes within a complex and chaotic environment. The study begins with a discussion on how the learning organization concept emerged, followed by a theoretical review of the concept. Defining and applying Senge’s five learning disciplines within the military realm follows to establish the linkage between the five disciplines and military outcomes. The study presents the 1899-1902 Philippine-American War as a historical example to illustrate how a military learning organization is brought about from the internalization and practice of the five disciplines and how these disciplines shaped the conduct of the

war and final outcomes. The study concludes with planning implications for future military operations.

Emergence of Learning Organization—A Vision of a Military Learning Organization

*No problem can be solved from the same consciousness that created it; we must learn to see the world anew.*¹⁸

Albert Einstein

The concept of learning organization emerges amidst the ebb of Newtonian and linear paradigms. The notions of cause and effect, reductionism, and isolation as an approach to understanding complexity, dominated the world during the Industrial Age. These forms of thinking are becoming more and more obsolete, inadequately able to accommodate and overcome the complex and chaotic nature of the world. In competitive business, many failing corporations came to realize their mechanical and linear strategies cannot adapt to constant change and sustain momentum toward success.¹⁹ As the world entered the information age, it called for a “new science” and a new paradigm to emerge as scientists could no longer ignore and dismiss non-linear aberrations and anomalies.²⁰

In the last fifty years, scholars have come to know the significance and relevancy of the interdependency and interrelationship among individual systems and the environment, developing an understanding of the greater whole created from the sum of behavior and the interactions of systems.²¹ It is through this understanding of systems that forms the foundation of a learning organization.

The lineage of a learning organization traces its roots in engineering, quantum physics, human resources, and organizational learning. Artificial intelligence, computers, robotics, and other advanced technology attempted to transform industrial age machinery into thinking systems, able to assimilate and respond to informational inputs from the

environment. The incredibly fast advances in technology, greater globalization, increasing economic and business competition, and environmental and ecological pressures created a high degree of complexity.²² While machines can be programmed to learn to deal with these complexities, their capacity to learn is constrained and limited by defined hardware and linear programs. Machines continued to rely on human interventions to spontaneously adapt and respond to various environmental inputs. Technology cannot, perhaps, ever replace human beings in a living world. Senge developed the learning organization concept based on the notion that success in the world of non-linearity and existing interrelated systems relies on the idea of learning.²³ Central to the idea is a human being's capacity to learn.²⁴

"People learn, not systems."²⁵ "Organizations learn only through individuals who learn. Individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning, but without it no organizational learning occurs."²⁶ Thus, bringing about a learning organization is dependent upon people's ability and capacity to learn. Human workers have a limitless and unconstrained capacity to learn and are able to spontaneously generate responses to changing conditions and unexpected inputs. Efforts in humanizing machines further brought into the forefront the value of human workers.²⁷ Properly trained and developed, human workers rely on their skills, knowledge, and each other to perform tasks and achieve organizational, and in many cases, extraordinary results. While machines become obsolete and antiquated, the learning process allows human workers to continue to survive, thrive and prosper through time amidst increasing complexity. Fast learning requires people to have certain disciplines.

The Fifth Discipline

In his book, *The Fifth Discipline*, Senge theorizes the practice and integration of the disciplines of systems thinking, personal mastery, shared vision, mental models, and team learning to facilitate adaptive and generative learning within a person and a group of people.²⁸ The internalization and harmonious interplay of these five learning disciplines give rise to a vision Senge calls a learning organization--“an organization which learns powerfully and collectively and is continually transforming itself to better collect, manage, and use knowledge” for success.²⁹ “It empowers people within and outside the company to learn as they work.”³⁰

The fifth discipline is systems thinking. Systems thinking recognizes the existence of two types of complexity: detail and dynamic. Detail complexity is situations where there are many variables that make up the whole; and where the effects of a certain cause and effect are uncovered. Dynamic complexity is “situations where cause and effect are subtle, and where the effects over time of interventions are not obvious.”³¹ The interrelationships of various causes and effects are vital to understanding the present condition. Identifying the leverages “lies in understanding dynamic complexity, not detail complexity.”³² Practicing the discipline of system thinking leads to a “shift of mind” allowing one to shift from seeing linear cause-effect changes and snapshots to seeing interrelationships and processes of change within an ocean full of detail and dynamic complexities.³³ From this shift of mind, one is able to see how the ocean transforms into reality through time from the existence, interactions, and behavior of various living systems.

The lense of systems thinking magnifies reality into circles of causality or influence. These circles of influence tell a story. Tracing the flows of influence will reveal repeating patterns; and when linked with time, the patterns uncovers the story of how a situation became better or worst. The types of influence each circle makes are either reinforcing or counteracting (balance) feedback. Identifying these reinforcing and balancing circles, or processes, help in building the patterns or structures into a story. This story then becomes a source for identifying problems, leverage points, and solutions. Senge identifies ten generic structures, that he calls "systems archetypes:" balancing process with delay; limits to growth; shifting the burden; shifting the burden to the intervenor; eroding goals; escalation; success to the successful; tragedy of the commons; fixes that fail; and growth and underinvestment.³⁴ (Later explained in this study, the archetypes of limits to growth, shifting the burden, and tragedy of the commons represent the complex problem of achieving pacification of the Philippines.) Consequences of an action are not readily apparent as the time between the cause and effect of that action increases. Systems archetypes help to link action and time. They graphically illustrate a story, revealing "an elegant simplicity underlying the complexity of management issues."³⁵ Systems thinking is the "conceptual cornerstone that underlies all of the five learning disciplines."³⁶ It is the essential glue that binds the other four disciplines.

Personal mastery is the discipline to develop and sustain competence, skills, confidence, and flexibility. It represents a personal commitment to seek, know, and use the truth, fostering creativity and innovative thinking and attitude. A person with a high degree of personal mastery embraces and works with changes as allies, allowing him to see reality clearly. He sees the gaps, or creative tension between his vision of where he

wants to be and the current status of reality as a source for energy. He uses this energy to produce the results he truly wants.³⁷ The discipline of personal mastery facilitates a “lifelong generative learning” within a person who wants to create his own future based on his understanding of reality.³⁸

How accurate a person is able to understand reality or truth depends on his mental models. Mental models are assumptions, generalizations, and images deeply ingrained within a person’s mind.³⁹ He sees the world through these models and bases his actions, thinking, and interactions from them. “Mental models of what can or cannot be done in different situations vary tremendously from person to person, and are often deeply entrenched and difficult to change.”⁴⁰ The discipline of mental model requires a person to first be aware of the existence and understand the influential effects of his mental models. Secondly, he must be willing to accept scrutiny without becoming defensive. Learning to bring out personal mental models allows a person to expand and explore the possibilities he never before considered. Integrating this learning discipline with systems thinking allows a person to develop flexible and innovative thinking.

The discipline of shared vision leads people and groups of people to coalesce their efforts and focus their energies for learning toward a common goal. Developing shared visions requires the discipline of personal mastery. Enrollment and compliance to a vision are not as effective as having people personally commit. People need to establish their own visions in support of a collective vision. “While adaptive learning is possible without vision, generative learning occurs only when people are striving to accomplish something that matters deeply to them.”⁴¹ Through this individual generative learning,

creativity arises enabling a person to use truth and reality to identify the path toward a shared vision.

The discipline of team learning facilitates the process of “aligning and developing the capacity of a team to create the results its members truly desire.”⁴² A group of people become a learning team when members develop personal supporting vision, commit to a shared vision, rely on one another’s expertise, value each other’s perspectives, and systemically create a desired outcome. Practicing the discipline of team learning requires the skill of dialogue. For a team to learn, every member must be able to suspend individual assumptions and participate in a meaningful conversation. It is a forum where free flowing ideas are shared, listen to, and entertained by all participants. Though sometimes appropriate, a discussion is a forum for defending ideas where participants have chosen a position. Aligning the learning efforts in a team is difficult when members choose to discuss. Such form of conversation is not conducive to the practice of the other four learning disciplines. Conversely, without the other learning disciplines, a group of people cannot practice team learning. Organizational learning will not occur. Teams of people are truly learning when they are continually discovering how to produce extraordinary results.

These five disciplines require nurturing and mastering. These disciplines help create a working environment, philosophy, and a climate that allow people to innovatively create desired results and their future through individual and collective learning. More importantly, it facilitates the creation of processes, strategies, methods, and approaches that allow an organization to learn fast. These five disciplines help

groups of people to bring about a learning organization. Central to this concept is human learning—people.

An Emerging Vision-- A Military Learning Organization

Senge's concept is significantly applicable within the military realm based on the concept's fundamental reliance on human beings' ability and capacity to learn, rather than a reliance on technology, to achieve success. Many scholars would quickly point out examples where technology did not guarantee military success. Technology provides tools to soldiers; still, it is the human intelligence of soldiers who employ these tools. Technology is one element of war that is always changing. The human dimension of warfare steadfastly remains a constant element in warfare. War is a dynamic human social interaction. As Carl Von Clausewitz states, "War is an act of human intercourse; it is a part of man's social existence."⁴³

Likewise, learning, too, is a part of man's continued existence. "Real learning gets to the heart of what it means to be human," it is "as fundamental to human beings as the sex drive."⁴⁴ A human being must do certain tangible and intangible actions so he can learn. Senge proposes, those intangible actions are internalizing and practicing the cognitive disciplines of systems thinking, personal mastery, shared visions, mental models, and team learning. These human-based disciplines and concepts affect human thinking and human interaction. Striving to achieve efficient and effective thinking and interaction requires continuous learning. Learning a certain way of thinking and interacting leads to a certain desired outcome. Since war and learning are fundamentally human based, the human based concept of learning organization is uniquely applicable to military warfare.

Thinking how to interact with an enemy in order to compel the enemy to do one's will requires learning. Facilitating and cultivating adaptive and generative learning requires a military organization and its members to internalize and practice Senge's five disciplines. In doing so, they increase their efficiency in compelling their enemy to submit to their will. As history records, the military with the most advanced technological capability is not always the victor.⁴⁵ In many cases, the victor is the military who learns to understand and manipulate the human dimension of war. It is the military who learns quickly-- a military learning organization.

This study derives the term military learning organization from Senge's concept. The word military is added to distinguish the inherit and significant differences between the two worlds of business and military. These differences may lead to arguments that the learning organization concept may be impracticable or unrealistic in the military world. Strict compliance and loyalty to orders, hierarchy, and uniformed codes of behavior; complete acceptance of political and military visions; or tendency to accept desired mental models are major aspects in the military that may or may not exist in corporations. One may argue these aspects prevent full practice of the disciplines of personal mastery, systems thinking, shared vision, mental models, and team learning as Senge envisioned. Can a military logically and realistically internalize and practice the Fifth Discipline?

If a military cannot internalize and practice the Fifth Discipline, it is probably due to learning disabilities. Unique disabilities still would not prevent a military organization from functioning within the generative vision of a learning organization if it is aware of, compensates and overcomes those disabilities. Nor do these disabilities prevent

individuals and organizations from internalizing the spirit and intent of the disciplines. The practice of these disciplines is realistically applicable even in the most restrictive environment, like the military. One needs only to refer to the battle analysis of military conflicts to discover the existence or essence of learning disciplines and how they contributed to military outcomes. Soldiers are human beings who are capable of internalizing and practicing human-based disciplines.

A cursory glance at the evolution of modern warfare provides some evidence that armies are, perhaps, one of the first organizations to recognize the value of people and human learning. A nation needs people-- soldiers, to fight its wars. During the dynastic era, nations fought and, in some cases, won wars based on quantity vice quality of people.⁴⁶ It was not until the era of nationalistic warfare that nations began to recognize the potent force arisen from a person's commitment to fight for his country. The effect of the personal commitment of each person who is willing to fight for his country produces an extraordinary outcome. This notion is particularly evident during the French Revolution, where Napoleon reaped the benefits of a national-based army. "Most of the French people who supported the [French] revolution had a personal stake in the [French] Republic's survival and were willing to participate in the national defense effort."⁴⁷ Soldiers were, and indeed continue to be, the most important asset to an army.

The German military reform during the period of 1939 to 1940 provides an example where a military organization linked the importance of human learning to tactical and political success. Through introspection and critical self-examination of its performance during the 1939 Polish Campaign, the German military identified that the inexperience of soldiers and (junior and mid-level) officers contributed to poor unit

performance.⁴⁸ "One of the most obvious ways to improve performance is by learning."⁴⁹ Developing the professional skills through officer training was a crucial factor for a military that relied on tactical and individual initiative during the impressive execution of their 1939 Polish Campaign.⁵⁰ It therefore embarked on a major training effort in preparation for war against France, Britain, and Belgium. The real secrets of the German Army's top-level training and organization were "in certain almost intangible qualities of intellectual training and outlook."⁵¹ The German military capitalized on their soldiers and officers' capacity to learn using training programs as the means to create the desperately needed experience. In doing so, the preparation helped the German military deliver to Adolf Hitler the conquest of Western Europe in the spring of 1940--a conquest recorded in the history of warfare as one of the most swiftly decisive victories.⁵² Those intangible qualities made up that intangible process of learning. Thus, the annals of military history provide evidentiary linkage between human learning and outcomes, giving credence to the existence of the essence of a military learning organization.

The U.S. Army is composed of people who have the capacity to learn. As Senge would say, soldiers learn, not systems. They are the embodiment of military organizational learning.⁵³ After all, the soldiers in the Army are the people who ultimately defend our nation's interests and accomplish missions. Soldiers are precious learning assets.⁵⁴ General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, reinforces this idea when he articulated his 1999 vision for the Army:

The Army -- is People. The magnificence of our moments as an Army will continue to be delivered by our people. They are the engine behind our capabilities, and the soldier remains the centerpiece of our formation. We will continue to attract, train, motivate, and retain the most competent and dedicated people in the Nation to fuel our ability to be persuasive in peace and invincible in war.⁵⁵

Therefore, borrowing from Senge's ideas and words, the armies that will truly excel in the future will be armies that discover how to tap soldiers' commitment and capacity to learn; something like a military learning organization. A military learning organization capitalizes on its people's learning capacity and fosters an environment where initiative, innovation, and creativity are valued and unleashed to achieve desired outcomes and to accomplish missions.

This study uses the premise that tactical success, victory and achievement of military goals and objectives, and mission accomplishment (all contributing toward compelling the enemy to do a certain will) in support of national policy are the desired outcomes of a military learning organization. The following analysis uses Senge's five disciplines as the analytical framework by which to develop an explanation of how the pacification of the Philippines in 1902 came about. The explanation serves to illustrate the influential effects of internalizing and practicing the five disciplines on the thinking and interactions of individuals and groups of people involved in the 1899-1902 Philippine War. It presents a basic historical example of bringing about a military learning organization.

The Philippine War, 1899-1902

*The future of the Philippine Islands is now in the hands of the American people, and the Paris Treaty commits the free and franchised Filipinos to the guiding hand and the liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies, the uplifting agitation, not of their American masters, but of their American emancipators.*⁵⁶

- President William McKinley, 1898

The 1898 American military intervention and retaliation against the Spanish atrocities in Cuba during the Spanish-American War fortuitously sparked a perplexing affair between the U.S. Army, Philippine nationalist insurgents, and Filipinos. The

thinking and interaction among these major groups of people dictated the course of their affair. While benefiting from a high degree of personal mastery, America and its army both suffered from the effects of a lack of political and military visions, flawed mental models, linear thinking, and hampered team learning.

Lacking Visions

Reports of Spanish atrocities in Cuba and the sinking of the *USS Maine*, while harbored in Havana, enraged America.⁵⁷ The American Congress rallied, authorizing President William McKinley to take necessary political and military actions. President McKinley sent an ultimatum directing Spain to relinquish control and occupation of the Cuban Island peacefully or face military confrontation. American forces deployed as Spain chose war. American political commitment and its vision for Cuba was clear—liberate Cuba from the oppressive Spanish rule and pursue Cuban independence.⁵⁸ However, American war policy made no mention of a commitment to liberate the Filipinos from three hundred years of Spanish oppression. The fact that there had been an independence movement by Filipino nationalists against Spain since 1896 made no impact. America had no vision for the Philippines.⁵⁹ What to do with the Philippines and its people remained an undetermined issue. The first effects of an undefined vision were confusion and uncoordinated initiatives.

The lack of shared vision from all levels had far reaching effects. At the political level, American diplomats assigned in far eastern nations sought ways to contribute toward defeating Spain.⁶⁰ Military plans identified the necessity to destroy the Spanish fleet harbored in Manila Bay, a main port in the Philippines.⁶¹ With prospects of fighting the Spaniards in the Philippines, Consul E. Spencer Pratt in Singapore met with Emilio

Aguinaldo on 24 April 1898. Aguinaldo was an exiled Filipino nationalist who led an independence movement against Spanish rule in 1897.⁶² After his meeting, Pratt told Commodore George Dewey, Commander of the U.S. Fleet who was sent to Manila Bay, about Aguinaldo's willingness to cooperate and assist in defeating the Spaniards in Manila.⁶³ Commodore Dewey would later meet with Aguinaldo himself. In attempting to develop and maintain a set of available options to support whatever national policies were declared, Commodore Dewey arranged to transport Aguinaldo back to the Philippines.

Commodore Dewey's impressive destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on 1 May 1898 should have made the formulation and declaration of a Philippine policy more urgent, requiring an immediate political response. It was a very pressing and vital issue that affected subsequent military operations, particularly the Army's mission. Washington did not respond. Aguinaldo arrived on 12 May 1898. Why the U.S. helped return Aguinaldo to the Philippines became another source of confusion. Filipinos perceived this act of kindness to mean America was not only going to destroy Spanish rule but they would also help Aguinaldo form his presidency and an independent Philippine Republic. Such perceptions were clearly contrary to the vision of American colonization—a vision declared four months after the first American soldiers landed in Manila.

At the operational and tactical levels, American forces were forced to react as bits and pieces of a developing vision and policy were slowly revealed. After his victory, newly promoted Admiral Dewey requested from Washington guidance concerning the Spanish occupying colonial government and forces headquartered in Manila. He knew

he did not have enough ground forces to conduct an offensive against, what he estimated as 10,000 Spaniards.⁶⁴ Even if he did have the forces to secure Manila, the option had political ramifications. "International law would hold the United States responsible for the protection of non-Spanish persons and property in the city, and the law of humanity would hold them equally responsible for the protection of all other non-combatants."⁶⁵ Admiral Dewey knew he would obligate the United States to abide by this law if he secured Manila—an obligation he had no authority to make. He waited for directions while his forces maintained control of the ports. Still without a formulated policy or vision, President McKinley authorized the dispatch of an expeditionary force made up of over 15,000 troops and appointed Major General Wesley Merritt as the ground force commander in response to Admiral Dewey's inquiry.⁶⁶

What began as a promising diplomatic and military initiative, Aguinaldo's return and involvement slowly became a nightmare for the US Army. Aguinaldo walked away from his meetings with the American consuls and Dewey back in April with the intent of establishing Philippine independence and his presidency with American help.⁶⁷ From their official statements, the consuls and Dewey vehemently denied making any agreements that would lead Aguinaldo to his conclusions.⁶⁸

On 24 May 1898, Aguinaldo rejuvenated the Philippine independence movement. He declared himself a dictator until a formal government was established. In the month of June, Aguinaldo formed the framework for a revolutionary Philippine government, declared Philippine independence, and asserted himself as the President. Reacting to Aguinaldo's actions and the escalating confusion at the tactical level, Washington directed both diplomatic and military subordinates to refrain from recognizing or

conducting joint efforts with the Filipino insurgents to include Aguinaldo. Records show this directive was passed from the Secretary of the Navy to newly promoted Admiral Dewey on 26 May and from the Secretary of State to Consul Pratt on 16 June, weeks after the meetings with Aguinaldo and his subsequent return to the Philippines.⁶⁹

Unfortunately, Washington's late directive exacerbated the confusion and problem. Complying with Washington's directive, Admiral Dewey, American diplomats, and the APEF made no actions to indicate American objection or recognition.

The absence of an American response served to reinforce the Filipino's perceptions and Aguinaldo's interpretation of the meetings with Pratt and Dewey. As the APEF landed, it became increasingly evident to Aguinaldo that America had a different agenda. As Aguinaldo aggressively pursued his own agenda, tension between the U.S. Army, Aguinaldo's insurgents, and the Filipinos was increasing. This tension, arising from the lack of vision, gradually escalated into a systems-wide disaster.

While the first units of the American-Philippine Expeditionary Force landed in the Philippines on 30 June 1898, senior army generals continued the struggle to define the Army's exact mission and military vision within an unclear national policy.⁷⁰ As the Filipinos saw the U.S. Navy bring Aguinaldo back and Aguinaldo's proclamation of independence, they also saw the increasing presence of the Army as the force who would help oust Spain and establish Aguinaldo's Philippine government.⁷¹ The insurgents, however, became increasingly suspicious, especially when the first generals to arrive, Brigadier General Thomas M. Anderson, refused to recognize Aguinaldo's authority. Suspicion, reluctance, and confusion began to strain the Army's relationship with the Philippine people and the insurgents as Aguinaldo established government remained

unrecognized by the APEF. Confused and without any other options, Aguinaldo's insurgents and Filipinos reluctantly cooperated and helped General Anderson's units settle and prepare for an offensive. The insurgents prepared for an offensive, too, despite the instruction that the insurgents would not participate in expelling the Spaniards. Major General Merritt gave this instruction to Aguinaldo. Insulted and angry, Aguinaldo ignored the instruction. The APEF's units continued to land amidst the increasing tension with the Filipinos and Philippine insurgents.

High Degree of Personal Mastery

The experience, personal commitment, and diverse background of the members of the APEF constituted a high degree of personal mastery. The degree of personal mastery within the APEF's officer corps and enlisted members was high and appropriate to conducting a conventional battle, humanitarian operations, nation building and civil military government establishment despite their limited knowledge of Philippine culture, geography, and people.⁷² The commander of the 8th Army Corps, Major General Merritt arrived in the Philippines on 26 July 1898. Civil war veterans and professional and experienced officers predominately made up the officer corps who served under Major General Merritt.⁷³ Brigadier General's Anderson, Francis V. Greene, Arthur MacArthur, and Charles King commanded the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th expeditionary forces or brigades, respectively. While Major General Merritt had reservations about some of the American volunteers and militiamen (known today as reservists and guardsmen) that filled his ranks, these civilian-turned-soldiers had varied civilian skills, education, and experience. The volunteers proved instrumental to both the conduct of military offensives and civil programs.⁷⁴ Led by experienced military leaders, the volunteers, militia, and regular

active duty soldiers were quite effective and efficient in accomplishing their tactical missions despite a vague Philippine policy.⁷⁵

Preceding a clearly defined policy were President McKinley's two directives concerning the insurgents and Filipinos. As mentioned above, his first directive mandated no recognition of or military alliance with the Filipino national insurgents. Secondly, he instructed General Merritt to provide security and protection; present a non-threatening occupation; and foster a benevolent relationship with all the inhabitants.⁷⁶

As defined by President McKinley, benevolent assimilation "was to insure the security of the inhabitants in their persons and property and to make them understand that the American troops had not come to make war upon the people of the Philippines but to protect them; the occupation was to be as free from severity as possible."⁷⁷ Unlike Spanish rule that subjugated the Filipinos into slavery, President McKinley wanted the Filipinos to come to understand they would be free citizens under the American military occupation. Eventually, this same benevolent policy became the basis of a permanent American sovereignty over the Philippines.

"The Battle of Manila proved that the volunteers, militia, and Regulars in the American forces could operate effectively when led properly."⁷⁸ Fortunately, the Spaniards were not a formidable force. Fearing a bloody American attack and a Filipino retaliatory killing, the Spaniards negotiated with Major General Merritt to stage a battle portraying an honorable fight before surrendering.⁷⁹ This negotiation was not known to the members of the APEF to include leaders like General MacArthur. The battle for Manila began and ended on 13 August 1898. The Filipino insurgents surrounded Manila, anxiously waiting to oust the Spaniards.⁸⁰ During the chaotic battle, the APEF found

itself fighting off the Spaniards and preventing Aguinaldo's insurgents from participating in the fight. As planned, the Spaniards surrendered to Major General Merritt. Due to the primitive communications systems, Major General Merritt later learned Spanish and American representatives had signed a peace protocol on 12 August.⁸¹ The agreement recognized the legitimate occupation of the Philippines by the APEF, impending formal negotiations. The high degree of the APEF's personal mastery sufficiently allowed the APEF to survive the first ground confrontation.⁸² The defeat of Spain finally pressured President McKinley to formulate a vision and policy for the Philippines. Unfortunately, American policy, vision, and ensuing decisions were influenced more by the bias and beliefs of individuals.

Flawed Mental Models

Mental models directly influenced President McKinley's vision and policy.⁸³ They were models that were entirely shared by the majority of pro-imperialist politicians and army soldiers.⁸⁴ These Americans viewed the Filipinos as "little brown brothers" who were incapable of self-rule. The Filipinos' culture, standard and way of living, and oppressive past were deemed inferior. Left to their own devices, imperialists argued anarchy would result and the Philippines would likely be conquered by nations like France, Britain, Germany, or Japan. In the eyes of President McKinley, Admiral Dewey, Major General Merritt, and Major General Otis, the insurgent Aguinaldo fit their views and considered him incapable of governing. In their minds, the Philippines would benefit from American sovereignty.

The perspectives of soldiers were similar. Regarding Filipinos as "niggers," "savages," and "gugu," soldiers ridiculed the inhabitants.⁸⁵ During the Philippine-

American War, "U.S. soldiers frequently burned entire barrios, beat up noncombatants, administered the "water cure" to them, and otherwise abused them."⁸⁶ They had no respect toward the Filipinos, particularly those insurgents who mutilated fellow American soldiers. In retaliation, soldiers performed brutal and cruel interrogation of captured insurgents. These actions directly went against President McKinley's policy of benevolent assimilation. Senior officers, to include military governors and commanders, did not tolerate these brutal acts and promptly punished the guilty. Unfortunately, despite the commitment of senior officers, brutal acts still occurred.

Following the battle in Manila, Major General Merritt refocused his APEF's efforts to establishing peace and order and to pave the way for pacification. He ensured all military initiatives and the behavior of his soldiers abide by the benevolent policies during this time of transition. He appointed Brigadier General MacArthur as Provost-Marshall-General to establish order, justice, and peace and initiated a series of public health programs. After much deliberation, debates with anti-imperial politicians, and encouraging advice from diplomats, President McKinley directed U.S. representatives to enter the Treaty of Paris negotiation with the annexation of the Philippines in mind.⁸⁷ This was the first indication that the President's intention leaned toward the desire to colonize or pacify the Philippines.

Major General Merritt relinquished command to Major General Otis on 29 August 1898 and left for Paris to take part in the treaty negotiations. Major General Otis continued General Merritt's initiatives and loyally complied with President McKinley's benevolent guidance. During the negotiations President McKinley continued to develop his policy and began to believe a benevolent relationship would encourage the Filipinos

to accept American sovereignty. Despite problems with the insurgents, Major General Otis provided positive reports that encouraged President McKinley to negotiate the procurement of all the Philippine Islands. The inaccurate beliefs that the Filipinos had no ability for self-rule and they all welcomed American sovereignty were the most prevalent mental model. It was a mental models that led President McKinley to decide on the procurement and pacification of the Philippines. This belief of Filipino inferiority was also shared among some American soldiers in the country. Their negative behavior and attitude were a direct reflection of how they perceived the Filipinos.

Lack of Systems Thinking

While the politicians negotiated, Major General Otis focused his Army to establishing a military government and inaccurately relied on benevolence to gain Filipino and insurgent support. He ignored the significance of the insurgent's resistance. Concentrating on establishing city government, Major General Otis dispersed the APEF throughout the country. He reorganized the 8th Corps and placed Major General's Anderson and MacArthur (newly promoted) in command of 1st and 2nd Division, respectively. The APEF's colonization effort occasionally clashed with Aguinaldo's self-declared government.

Aguinaldo refused to subordinate himself to the APEF demanding immediate recognition of his government and Philippine independence. From September 1898 to January 1899, Major General Otis attempted to negotiate with Aguinaldo from a firm and unwavering position. Irritated, angered, and insulted, Aguinaldo was forced to comply with every demand Major General Otis mandated. However, Aguinaldo refused to accept American colonization of his country. The resulting Treaty of Paris signed on 19

December 1898 gave the U.S. a legitimized claim, paying 20 million dollars to Spain to cede the entire Philippine Islands to America.⁸⁸ Subsequent publication of President McKinley's proclamation of American sovereignty confirmed for Aguinaldo that the American presence was permanent.

On 4 February 1899, the Philippine War began when an American soldier fired at a small group of Filipino insurgents, representing Aguinaldo's Philippine soldiers, who refused to heed challenges and continued to approach the Army's defenses.⁸⁹ Subsequent exchanges of fire between the APEF and insurgents launched violent events that undermined and weakened President McKinley's benevolent assimilation. Anti-imperialist movements in America gave Aguinaldo some hope that his ensuing conventional battles would make the U.S. government negotiate for peace under his terms. The beginning of the Philippine War was the last indication that the pacification of the Philippines evolved into a highly complex and chaotic systems problem. Unfortunately, Major General Otis failed to approach the pacification problem from a systems point of view. He never recognized the interdependence between his forces, insurgents, and Filipinos.

The relations between the APEF, insurgents, and Filipinos were complicated. The interactions among these groups of people were characterized by fidelity of violence, disloyalty, mistrust, dishonesty, prejudice, and greed. Some Filipinos naturally relied on survival instincts, doing whatever it took to stay alive and to protect the lives of their family members. Those who supported the insurgents did so either out of loyalty to the independence and nationalistic movement or in response to violent and fatal insurgent threats. Others supported the APEF believing they stood the chance of profiting more

from an American government than an insurgent established rule. Throughout the war, the Filipinos were divided. However, Major General Otis continued to believe the majority of the Filipinos, to include the insurgents, would come around and see the benefits of an American government. He dispersed his forces to occupy "400 posts and stations throughout the islands."⁹⁰ He busied himself in establishing municipal governments and reduced the problem of insurgency in his reports to Washington though his subordinate commanders were reporting significant insurgency resistance. Censoring journalists and reporters, Major General Otis allowed President McKinley to draw inaccurate perceptions of what was truly occurring in the Philippines.⁹¹ These perceptions then became the basis of the President's actions, decisions, and policies.

The Army found itself in a very difficult position, simultaneously conducting military operations against the insurgency and implementing civil government policies and programs. When Major General Otis finally realized something had to be done against the insurgents, he relied on military force. He linearly deduced that by destroying the insurgency, all Filipinos would observe the might of the American conventional force and quickly accept pacification. A major offensive against the insurgents in the winter of 1899 weakened the inexperienced and poorly equipped Philippine insurgents. An apparent decisive victory led Major General Otis to believe the insurgency was quelled.

In January 1899, President McKinley offered to send a civil commission "to aid the General [Otis] in the delicate task of obtaining recognition of American rule through the use of diplomacy rather than force."⁹² Major General Otis accepted this offer. Unfortunately, the arrival and efforts of the commission, led by Cornell University President Jacob G. Schurman, caused tension. Both Schurman and the General disagreed

with the types and execution of pacification programs. Progress was slow. In the mean time, the insurgents learned.

Under his tenure, Major General Otis implemented policies and made decisions that fostered adaptive learning within the APEF. The APEF managed to survive without being defeated by the insurgents but failed to compel both the insurgents and Filipinos to accept American sovereignty quickly. The insurgents learned to change their conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare as they recognized they could not defeat a well-resourced American force. The change in tactics was transparent to Major General Otis.⁹³ Erroneously believing the insurgency problem was solved, Major General Otis saw this time as an opportunity for an honorable end of his tenure. He volunteered to relinquish and turned over his command and military governorship to Major General MacArthur on 5 May 1900.

The Chaotic Aspect of the Philippine War

The scope of the APEF's unprecedented military operations in the Philippines is both complex and chaotic.⁹⁴ The dynamics and fluidity of the operation were due to a wide range of elements. One element was a sophisticated learning enemy.

The APEF faced a sophisticated *learning* enemy who had significant shortfalls. The insurgents' experience in overthrowing Spain was inferior compared to the American soldiers' experience in the American Civil War and Indian Campaign.⁹⁵ Not all insurgent leaders had military experience. Some were selected based on prominence in the community or family affiliation. In addition, the APEF were better resourced to fight a conventional war. Secondly, there were various insurgency groups who did not share the same interests or common vision. Various sects had varying aims different from

Aguinaldo. While Aguinaldo wanted an independent Philippine Republic under his rule, some of "the sects wanted to bring about a radical change in society."⁹⁶ These sects employed different tactics and guerrilla policies which caused the APEF to employ unique pacification policies and tactics.⁹⁷ Third, the insurgents' mental model that they could win a protracted war with the U.S. was flawed by the fact that they did not have reliable and continuous logistics and supplies.

Despite their inferior personal mastery, lack of shared vision, and flawed mental model, Aguinaldo's insurgents demonstrated an ability to perform systems thinking and team learning. The insurgents' linked the political effects of the 1900 U.S. presidential election to their cause. After realizing that they could not win a conventional war with a strong and resourced APEF, the insurgents changed tactics and pursued unconventional guerrilla warfare.⁹⁸ They sought a protracted war to buy time and await the result of the election. In their minds, an anti-imperialist U.S. president would champion their cause. However, when President McKinley was re-elected, the insurgents had no recourse but to continued their guerrilla movement. Though inferior, the insurgents presented a formidable challenge to the APEF for four full years.

Another element was the various spectrum of military operations in which the APEF faced. The three types of combat conditions (conventional against the Spaniards, conventional to unconventional against Aguinaldo's insurgents, and unconventional against the Moros insurgents) correlating with three different types of enemies, clearly placed the APEF in a highly precarious situation.⁹⁹ The task to subjugate a diverse set of people numbering over seven million through politically imposed method of benevolent assimilation created greater complications. Add in the execution of civil government,

humanitarian, and nation building programs and the whole APEF readily experienced both ends of the spectrum of military operations.

The scenario stimulated and mandated some form of learning. The APEF would come to rely on its capacity to deliberately learn about itself, Aguinaldo, the insurgents, Filipinoŝ, and the environment. The tenure of Major Generals Merritt and Otis is characterized by a period of adaptive learning.¹⁰⁰ The APEF survived the defeat of Spain; adjusted to the Philippine culture, geography, people, and insurgents; temporarily suppressed insurgency; and initiated the establishment of civil and military government to transform the Philippines into an American image. It took the administration and leadership of Major General MacArthur to develop processes and systems to enable the APEF to achieve generative learning and to learn faster than the insurgents.

Unlike his predecessor, Major General MacArthur believed the insurgency was still alive and a significant problem even after the conventional confrontation in October-November 1899. Major General MacArthur continued full implementation of civil programs while supervising military operations against guerrilla warfare. Despite a very strained relationship with Judge William H. Taft, president of the Second Philippine Commission, Major General MacArthur's wise and just military rule and General Frederick Funston's capture of Aguinaldo gradually won over the Filipinos.¹⁰¹ Country wide insurgent resistance was reduced to the southern portion of the islands.

Building on the success of Major General MacArthur, Major General Adna R. Chaffee took command of the APEF on 4 July 1901. General Chaffee's assumption of command also marked the transition of the APEF military government to a purely civil government entity led by Taft, the first civil governor. Areas where there were continued

localized pockets of insurgency remained under the governorship of Army officers.¹⁰²

“American soldiers developed and implemented pacification policies and methods designed to deal with the specific conditions of their immediate areas.”¹⁰³ The flexibility and innovation exhibited by the Army facilitated the submission to American rule by rebellious provinces. The last insurgent holds in Samar and Batangas finally fell to the APEF and their local military government’s transitioned to civil government in 1902. “With the dream of a Philippine republic crushed, Congress passed on 1 July 1902 the Philippine Government Act, and Theodore Roosevelt on 4 July declared the “insurrection” ended and proclaimed executive clemency for the Filipinos.”¹⁰⁴

The Pacification: Achieving Generative Learning with the Fifth Discipline

Today’s problems come from yesterday’s solutions: often we are puzzled by the causes of our problems; when we merely need to look at our own solutions to other problems in the past.

Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline

The American-Philippine Expeditionary Force’s journey toward a military learning organization began from the moment the first units landed in the Philippines on 30 June 1898 and culminated in the end of the Philippine War on 4 July 1902. There are two steps in understanding how the five disciplines influenced the thinking and interactions of the APEF and final outcomes. The first step is to apply systems thinking to explain the non-linearity and complex nature surrounding the pacification of the Philippines. The second step is to analyze the political and military leaders’ five disciplines and the resulting responses of various relevant systems.

A Systems Analysis

The complexity of pacifying the Philippines can be understood through three systems archetypes. In simplistic forms, the archetypes of limits to growth, shifting the burden, and tragedy of the commons represent the dynamics of the pacification problem that confronted the APEF.¹⁰⁵

The archetype of limits to growth (see figure 1) describes the interrelationship between the achievement of pacification, gaining Filipino support, and benevolent assimilation. After the end of the Spanish-American War, it took time for President




Figure 1. Limits to Growth

McKinley to finally declare the APEF's mission of establishing an American colonial government in the Philippines through benevolent assimilation.¹⁰⁶ President McKinley concluded with this mission under flawed mental models that the Filipinos welcomed American sovereignty with minimum resistance. Misleading the president were his advisors who based their recommendation from personal pledges of US allegiance by wealthy Filipinos who stood to gain more from an American presence.¹⁰⁷ What the president did not know was the majority of the Filipinos were not prepared for American sovereignty after the preceding three hundred years of Spanish rule.¹⁰⁸ The success of pacification relied on benevolent assimilation of the Filipinos. This relationship represent the growth process the APEF sought. However, the level of Filipino support influenced

benevolent assimilation. The willingness of the Filipinos to be assimilated depended on whether they believed supporting the APEF was beneficial. Gaining Filipino support became a limiting factor in achieving American colonization or pacification. During Major General Otis' tenure, gaining Filipino support decreased as the insurgents gradually benefited from benevolence.

Winning the hearts and minds of the Filipinos and the insurgents was a balancing feedback process. Attaining significant Filipino support was influenced by the suppression of the insurgency as the insurgents posed a threat to the protection and security to the Filipinos who chose not to support the insurgency.¹⁰⁹ Continued existence of the insurgency ensured continued insurgency influence over the Filipinos. The symbiotic relationship between the insurgents and Filipinos reflects the insurgents' need to influence the Filipinos in supporting their existence. Initially, the insurgents successfully convinced the populace of the selfish intention of the Americans, propagandizing the idea that Americans replaced the Spaniards only to gain the treasures of the Philippines and to continue to repress the rightful independence of the Filipino nationalists. The APEF countered these propagandas by building schools and establishing education programs. These were among the Filipinos' most favorite and well accepted pacification programs. Through these programs, the APEF gained support. As a result, the Filipinos swayed their support between the insurgents and the APEF.

In extreme cases, some insurgents resorted in brute force in an attempt to regain Filipino support. In Bucay, Abra, a center where insurgents received civilian support, the villagers decided to support the Americans when the APEF burned their village and restricted their movement. The insurgents responded by terrorizing the villagers. "Such

actions, however, turned the town even more solidly against the guerrillas.”¹¹⁰ When more Filipinos began to support the APEF, the insurgents resorted to terrorism and threat to intimidate the Filipinos. For a while, the Filipinos wavered support between the APEF and the insurgents. It was difficult for the APEF to maintain and procure more Filipino support. For the most part, Filipino support to the APEF fluctuated constantly due to the negative influence of the insurgents.

Benevolent assimilation created a shifting in burden. (See figure 2.) “In the early months of 1900, statements of American officers left no doubt that the army was firmly committed to its policy of benevolent pacification.”¹¹¹ The majority of the officers, led by the succeeding APEF commanders of Major General’s Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, and Chaffee, were committed to amicable, kind, and humanitarian efforts to win the hearts and minds of both the Filipinos and insurgents. However, “the U.S. commanders’ commitment of such policies and their subordinates’ execution of them did not, after all, necessarily guarantee that Filipinos would switch their allegiance.”¹¹²




Figure 2. Shifting the Burden

The insurgents, however, took advantage of benevolent policies to sustain their existence. “The American benevolent policy insured that the revolutionaries would be feared more than the Americans.”¹¹³ The effects of military offensives, implemented to reduce and destroy the resistance of the insurgency, were negated, as benevolent policies helped the captured insurgents or those who provided support to the insurgency. The

policies allowed captured insurgents to recycle through as prisoners only to be later released, allowing them to rejoin their revolutionary units. More disturbing was that once the insurgents learned who was helping the Americans, they would either violently threaten or fatally punish those Filipinos. At the same time, punishment was light for those who provided assistance to the insurgents. "Without popular support or the protection of the inhabitants that made such support possible the military operations in the field accomplished little."¹¹⁴ It did not take long for the Filipinos to understand how to survive between the two opposing forces. Thus, the Filipinos were made to both suffer and enjoy the fruits of benevolent assimilation.¹¹⁵

The archetype of tragedy of the commons accurately depicts the strained relationship between military and diplomatic efforts. (See Figure 3.) The Taft commission was tasked with the mission of establishing civil rule using the municipal system the APEF already emplaced. Gradually, by 1 September 1900, the commission would have legislative authority while the APEF military government exercised




Figure 3. Tragedy of the Commons

executive power in the colonial government.¹¹⁶ The commission had no members other than themselves by which to execute their mission. It was their assumption that the

APEF would provide the necessary manpower to assist them with their mission. While the APEF retained sole responsibility for defeating the insurgency and implementing pacification programs, the number of available soldiers became a limiting resource as the commission also relied on these soldiers to execute their programs. Additionally, the emotional tension between the commanders of the APEF and Taft negated amicable joint cooperation. Both shared a common goal of establishing civil government through similar pacification programs; however, they tragically competed for the same resources. At the personal level they struggled for power.

Hence, from a systems perspective, the problem with the pacification of the Philippines was more than Aguinaldo's revolutionary resistance. In fact, the Philippine War was one of the consequences resulting from a broader term and detailed patterns of behavior, responses, and interactions between the major groups of people involved, from the tactical to strategic level. Initially, the commission, Filipinos, insurgents, and APEF unknowingly created a system in which they became prisoners. It took the process of adaptive and generative learning on the part of the APEF to liberate themselves. Only when they saw patterns of events, reactions, and consequences that finally the APEF powerfully and successfully overcame the challenges posed by the complex and chaotic nature of Philippine pacification.¹¹⁷ As discussed later, the APEF uncovered the significance of the insurgents' activities and how they were able to sustain their existence. The APEF did this through the practice of systems thinking. This was the APEF's first step toward achieving generative learning. The second step was the internalization and practice of personal mastery, shared vision, mental model, and team

learning by first the leaders, then the soldiers. As history recorded, the APEF went through a process that led to adaptive learning first before generative learning.

Achieving Adaptive Learning with Major General's Merritt and Otis

Major General Merritt's command was plagued by a lack of vision, linear thinking and flawed mental models. His 1898 victory over the Spaniards, who occupied the Philippines, was more a product of the high degree of personal mastery of his subordinate leaders and soldiers. Though Major General Merritt felt his forces consisted of "volunteers from the western states, who, although enthusiastic, were undisciplined and lacked much of the equipment they would need for tropical service" they served him well.¹¹⁸ However, the personal mastery of these soldiers was not enough to effectively suppress the foreshadowing symptom of insurgency and overcome the challenges of establishing American colonial rule. Defeating the Spaniards was not the significant challenge, but it was dealing with Aguinaldo's revolutionaries and the Filipinos effectively and efficiently, which both General Merritt and President McKinley failed to recognize. The evolution of President McKinley's policy failed to keep pace with the unfolding events in the Philippines.¹¹⁹ The lack of clearly and timely stated political vision haunted the APEF throughout the initial stages of U.S. occupation.

In Merritt's defense, the lack of vision was primarily due to President McKinley's undefined Philippine policies, untimely declaration of goals, and vague directives. "Continued indecision on the part of officials in Washington about future American policy would make the army's work more difficult."¹²⁰ The President's desire to keep numerous options available only led to unclear political objectives, making it difficult for Merritt to come up with mission concepts. In the absence of a vision at the political

level, Merritt did the best he could to established common shared focus and direction.¹²¹ The only constant theme President McKinley directed was the American force must professionally establish benevolent relations with the Filipinos and take necessary measures against those who endangered the “welfare and happiness and the rights of the inhabitants”¹²² of the Philippines.

It was not Major General Merritt’s idea to return Aguinaldo to Manila, a move that complicated the pacification problem. What purpose did it serve the U.S. to bring Aguinaldo back if he and his insurgents were not allowed to participate in driving the Spaniards out? Days before the offensive against the occupying Spaniards, Major General Merritt finally received the guidance that the American forces were not allowed to negotiate with Aguinaldo and his government for they were not politically recognized by the U.S.¹²³ If this guidance had been stated even before Dewey’s impressive defeat of the Spanish fleet in Manila, no American would have met with Aguinaldo and no U.S. ships would have been used to transport Aguinaldo back to his native country.

Major General Merritt failed to see the affects of his flawed mental models and the systems nature and effects of the interaction of the insurgency. This model formed his linear understanding of the pacification problem and inaccurate perceptions that the Filipinos did not want independence but welcomed American rule with wide-open arms. Initially believing the insurgency could become a great obstacle, Major General Merritt convinced himself otherwise after the defeat of Spain. With a changed mental model, he debriefed the politicians in August 1898 on the dispositions of the Philippine situation:

Merritt, showing a change of mind, stated that he thought there was no danger of conflict as long as the United States and not Spain retained the islands. He assured the peace commissioners that the islands other than Luzon were not a part of Aguinaldo’s revolt. Eduard Andre, the Belgian consul in Manila, wrote that he was convinced the rebellion represented only one-half of one percent of

the archipelago's inhabitants. Other depositions included statements to the effect that many of the Filipinos were perfectly willing to accept an American government and were anxious for the United States to take possession of the islands. The opinions presented in Paris on the subject of the Filipino capacity for self-government were similar to that of Major J. Franklin Bell—"they are unfit."¹²⁴

"A policy based on the assumption that the local population was not fit to rule itself was incompatible with the desires of a self-assertive, partially Westernized elite and middle class."¹²⁵ Merritt failed to see systems consisting of the insurgents, Filipinos, and his forces. He failed to see the interrelationships of patterns revealed in the behavior and outcomes from the interactions. In one of the most inaccurate assumptions shared between Major General Merritt and President McKinley, both truly believed once the benevolence and benefits of American rule were recognized both the Filipinos and insurgents would pledge U.S. allegiance. Major General Merritt did not recognize how the effects of three hundred years of foreign rule fostered suspicion on a new American colonial master.¹²⁶ He underestimated the effects of the insurgency and overestimated the effects of benevolent assimilation.¹²⁷ These compounding views prevented him from developing effective policies to resolve the daunting challenges of pacification. When his beliefs failed to realize, it further stimulated confusion throughout the APEF command. Major General Otis, who replaced Merritt, suffered the same shortfalls.

Major General Otis also lacked system thinking, was unable to suspend his mental models, and hampered team learning. "Major General Otis was extremely interested in the problems of government and spent long hours personally attending to the task of remaking Manila in the American image."¹²⁸ Establishing military government through benevolence was foremost in Major General Otis' mind. As noted historian John M. Gates observes:

President McKinley's instructions to the expeditionary force regarding the establishment of military government in the Philippines and General Merritt's proclamation to the inhabitants of Manila bore a striking resemblance to instructions and proclamations issued much earlier during similar American experiences in Louisiana, Florida, and the territories occupied during the Mexican War. In each case the maintenance of law and order, the respect of local laws and customs, and the benevolent intentions of the United States were stressed. General Merritt or other officers of the expeditionary force undoubtedly were familiar with these previous American attempts at military government. In the Philippines, however, the Americans placed a greater emphasis on the civilizing mission of reconstructing the area under their control in the American image.¹²⁹

While he was able to develop shared military vision in support of establishing civil military government, as mention previously, he was unable to link the effects of the interdependency and interactions of the insurgents, Filipinos, President McKinley's benevolent policies and his forces. His inability to view the pacification challenge systematically was due to the influential effects of his flawed mental models.¹³⁰

"Unfortunately, he was also inclined to accept information that conformed to his existing convictions, and optimistic in his views of every situation except where such optimism would justify curtailing his power."¹³¹ Like Major General Merritt, Major General Otis believed every Filipino to include the insurgents, was incapable of self-government, and would quickly pledge allegiance to the US.¹³² The rich Filipinos helped him sustain such models encouraging him with information to ensure the Americans remained. These were the Filipinos who stood to loose a lot with a government run by one of the Filipino nationalists.

To Major General Otis, the insurgency resistance was manageable and negligible. Major General Otis' reports had this theme that further misled President McKinley of the true nature and great degree of resistance by Aguinaldo and his insurgency.¹³³ He

censored negative articles, engaging in deceitful information operations.¹³⁴ He attempted to mislead Aguinaldo when he deliberately altered President McKinley's 21 December 1898 U.S. Sovereignty Proclamation, changing all terms that indicated U.S. intention to remain as an occupying and ruling government.¹³⁵ Learning of this deceitful attempt, Aguinaldo retaliated and prepared his insurgents for war. If Aguinaldo had any trust left for the APEF during this point in history, Major General Otis' censorship attempts surely destroyed it.

Major General Otis, "like Merritt a Civil War hero, was a fastidious, pompous, and fussy man who inspired few of his subordinates."¹³⁶ Team learning within the APEF was hampered by his detail minutia leadership style. He was unwilling to listen to subordinates' ideas and suggestions.¹³⁷ His strict management of how his subordinate leaders executed his policies was under his personal microscope. Fortunately, his decision to distribute his forces to various towns and villages to establish military government made it difficult for him to micro-manage but gave subordinate leaders room to exercise initiative and freedom of execution. However, such a team effort was not enough to quickly solve the problem of insurgency and pacification. Major General Otis was unable to deal with the truth of the significant insurgency resistance, to suspend his mental models, and to facilitate team learning. Yet, despite these shortfalls, the APEF adapted to the chaos. Its continued occupation was challenged but never endangered to the point of termination. The only value of Major General Otis' leadership allowed the APEF to achieve adaptive learning, enabling the organization to survive the first two years in the Philippines.

Achieving Generative Learning with Major General MacArthur

The actions and performance of Major General MacArthur, particularly during his tenure as the third military governor and commander of the APEF, demonstrated a personal internalization and practice of the five disciplines. Historical records and analysis infer Major General MacArthur displayed the following: 1) a high degree of personal mastery in soldiering, leading, administrating, and knowing his opposition (he had a passion for Army service, 2) used systems thinking to analyze the pacification problem, 3) supported the shared vision of providing a secure environment to facilitate the establishment of military and civil government, 4) suspended his personal mental models to make appropriate decisions, and 5) encouraged candid dialogue among his subordinates and supported their initiatives.¹³⁸ The positive effects of these actions helped enhance the APEF's capacity to learn how to compel the Filipinos to accept American sovereignty.

In his book, The General's General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur, Kenneth Young describes Major General MacArthur as a autodidactic, morally ethical, and professional soldier.¹³⁹ His passion for Army service began as a seventeen year old, enlisting in the Union Army in August 1862. He became one of the youngest regimental commanders in the American Civil War, receiving the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions on Missionary Ridge. Prior to the Philippine-American War, "he had served in the Regular Army for thirty-two years, studying and training for the possibility of war."¹⁴⁰ He was competent, confident, and committed to achieving national objectives through military means. His experience in the Philippines made him well qualified for the position of military governor.

He was experienced in developing supplementing military visions in support of political visions. He remained loyal to President McKinley's benevolent policy and demanded the same from his soldiers. Guidance and policies echoed the importance of establishing military and civil government based on the policy of benevolence. "We have to govern them," MacArthur declared, and "government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans." Benevolent and humanitarian action was needed to win the enduring friendship of the great mass of Filipinos."¹⁴¹

He implemented systems-based programs as he saw the pacification as a systems problem. Major General MacArthur saw the value of capturing Aguinaldo alive and using him to convince the majority of the insurgents to surrender.¹⁴² He sanctioned the formation of the Filipino Federal party that would serve to counter the insurgency movement and to pursue peace under American sovereignty.¹⁴³ Major General MacArthur comprehensively and systematically approached the problem of reconciling U.S. supremacy with the national aspirations of the various groups of Filipinos.¹⁴⁴ One shortcoming the general had was his dislike of the civilian commissioners led by William Taft.

In the general's defense, President McKinley sent the commission upon Major General Otis' recommendation. (As mentioned earlier in this study this recommendation was founded on Major General Otis' flawed belief that the insurgency was quelled and terminated.) Much of Major General MacArthur's disagreement with Taft was the use of military personnel to conduct Taft's own civil programs.¹⁴⁵ Major General MacArthur believed, civil programs cannot succeed without first establishing a secured environment. His priority was placed on military tasks, secondary was Taft's tasks.

Major General MacArthur's did not share the same mental models of General's Merritt and Otis. General "MacArthur believed the Filipinos should be in charge of building their country, and he did not want to interfere with their culture or customs. He hoped that they would regard the United States as a protector rather than as a conqueror."¹⁴⁶ Major General MacArthur did not hesitate to recruit Filipinos to replace troops, as Washington mandated reductions in troops and defense spending.¹⁴⁷ This decision increased the trust the Filipinos had for the general. He saw the good and moral sides of the Filipinos. Believing that there were Filipinos who were tired of fighting, Major General MacArthur issued on 21 June 1900 a proclamation of amnesty for those insurgents who surrendered.¹⁴⁸ After the amnesty period, armed Filipinos would be labeled as bandits, criminals, or murderers and subjected to court. Taft ridiculed the amnesty and accused Major General MacArthur of being too lenient when drastic measures was called for.

Major General MacArthur appropriately suspended his own mental models to implement decisions. Despite his dislike of Taft, he realized since his amnesty program failed to achieve significant results Taft's idea of tougher treatment against the insurgents was appropriate. He realized the significance of the insurgents' influence over the hearts and minds of the Filipinos and over the APEF's efforts in establishing U.S. colonial rule.¹⁴⁹ Young writes,

By late October [1900], MacArthur reluctantly concluded that harsher military measures were needed to curtail the guerrilla bands harassing the U.S. garrisons. His lenient, humanitarian policies had failed. From June to October, 5,022 Filipino soldiers had accepted amnesty, but they were only a small percentage of the total rebels in the field. Guerrilla warfare demanded more stringent measures than MacArthur wished to employ, but he realized that the war could only be won by terminating the support the

towns and villages gave to the revolutionaries in the form of information, supplies, and sanctuary.¹⁵⁰

Upon this realization, Major General MacArthur initiated an offensive campaign to isolate and starve the insurgents of military and logistical support from various villages. Villages where there was insurgent resistance were burned. He authorized the capture of armed bandits, 79 of which were hanged.¹⁵¹ As suggested by Taft, he deported insurgents who were tried once, released and rejoined the resistance. Simultaneously, Major General MacArthur continued to establish civil government and humanitarian projects. The Filipinos favorably viewed education, sanitation, engineering and other programs that helped promote better living conditions.

Major General MacArthur valued candid dialogue and discussion with his soldiers. "He talked to each of them [brigade and regimental commanders] separately and discussed topics much broader than the war itself. He also encouraged his officers to express their opinions and assured them that anything they said would remain confidential."¹⁵² He found these sessions enlightening, generating innovative and creative ideas. While his soldiers learned from his mentorship, Major General MacArthur would also benefit personally. Team learning became a source of energy and solutions for him.

A significant example of generating solutions came from the intelligence operations and analysis that matured during Major General MacArthur's tenure. While the initiative to form an intelligence office began under Major General Otis' administration, the military intelligence efforts matured from the various civil affairs programs executed by the four departmental commanders.¹⁵³ "Because 'civil affairs' was subject to wide interpretation, some officers broadened their work to include

investigations into guerrilla activities.”¹⁵⁴ Captain John G. Ballance, as the chief intelligence officer in First District, Department of Northern Luzon, analyzed that the insurgent activities in the province of Ilocos Norte could be terminated by creating employment and markets to bring income to the poverty stricken families.¹⁵⁵ Funds for road-building projects and other civil affairs programs generated income to the villagers, who then began to see the benefits of supporting American programs. They subsequently became easily convinced to turn their backs against the insurgents. Gradually, the insurgents lost their bloodline from the Filipino civilian support in Ballance’s area.

Another example of intelligence exploitation pertained to the revelation of the insurgents’ infrastructure. Lieutenant William T. Johnston, an intelligence officer in the First District, Department of Northern Luzon, revealed the complete logistic, intelligence, and military structure of the insurgents operating within the province of La Union. This monumental discovery was a direct result of Lieutenant Johnston’s ability to convince a captured insurgent leader named Crispulo Patajo that by providing assistance to the APEF the results would be for the best interest for his secular guerrilla group known as the Guardia de Honor.¹⁵⁶ The essential tasks of destroying the insurgent infrastructure and the insurgents control over the Filipino population greatly contributed to the generative learning of the APEF. Major General MacArthur “incorporated many of Johnston’s findings into his own annual report and later into the policies that were implemented throughout the archipelago.”¹⁵⁷ He encouraged and resourced initiatives, like Ballance and Johnston’s efforts, to discover innovative and creative systems solutions to reconciling the Filipinos to U.S. intentions and the challenge of pacification.

The APEF learned as Major General MacArthur learned. His inferred internalization of the five learning disciplines fostered the APEF to enhance its capacity to learn quickly. In doing so, Major General MacArthur set the course for the APEF to progress toward pacification.¹⁵⁸ General Chaffee would reap the benefits of Major General MacArthur's labor, using the processes and systems developed from the generative learning of the APEF toward the declaration of complete pacification of the Philippines in 4 July 1902.¹⁵⁹ Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell served under Major General MacArthur. It was no surprise that Brigadier General Bell's command philosophy and strategy directly reflected Major General MacArthur's systems approach toward the complexity of pacifying the Philippines and balancing the effects and employment of benevolent policies. Upon assuming command of the Third Brigade, Batangas/Laguna Department on 1 December 1901 (six months after Major General MacArthur's departure), Brigadier General Bell told his soldiers,

We owe the pacific people protection and must adopt some way of demonstrating our ability to give it. We must then show our intention to punish insurgents and those who aid and assist them. In doing this we will unquestionable be required, by a sense of duty, to do much that is disagreeable. But after all armed insurgents are forced to submit to constituted authority and peaceful conditions are re-established within the Brigade, we can then be benevolent and generous again and convince the people that we are their real friends. Without first whipping them and convincing them that we are able to accomplish our purposes by force if necessary, we can never gain their friendship, because otherwise we can never command their respect.¹⁶⁰

In summary, Major General MacArthur, as the military governor, understood the dynamic complexity that faced the APEF and then implemented systems-based approaches.¹⁶¹ In doing so, the APEF learned to become increasingly efficient while the

insurgents and Filipinos learned to be compelled to do the American's will of pacifying the Philippines. Major General MacArthur's internalization and practice of the five disciplines manifested in his own and the APEF's thinking and interaction. During his tenure, the insurgent infrastructure was destroyed and rebel activity declined; vast areas were rapidly turned over to civilian control; increasing numbers of Filipinos became more involved in governing as more supported American sovereignty; increased efforts in implementing pacification programs; implemented benevolent policies while denying the insurgents from the beneficial effects those policies resulting in the achievement of pacification. More importantly, it was under Major General MacArthur's tenure that the APEF went beyond and complemented adaptive learning with generative learning. As such, the APEF reached a point where it functioned within the realm of a military learning organization.

Implications of the Fifth Discipline to Future Military Operations

Some things can be learned in peacetime, and others only in war, and that if the military are to make the most of their opportunities when war comes they must be organizationally prepared to learn.

Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes¹⁶²

The APEF's experience in the Philippine War illustrates two effects from the internalization and practice of the disciplines of systems thinking, personal mastery, building shared visions, mental models, and team learning. The most significant effect is how a military learning organization is brought about. As such, the intangible effects of these disciplines create the necessary ingredients to achieve adaptive learning and generative learning. The complexity and chaotic nature of military operations are effectively dealt with and overcome by these types of learning. Secondly, the five

learning disciplines influentially affect the thinking and interaction of individuals and organization as they deal with their adversary. The disciplines do facilitate the creation of the organization's desired outcome of achieving political and military objectives and compelling the enemy to do its will.

The political objective of pacifying the Philippines took four years. Four years were the amount of time that the APEF took to achieve both adaptive and generative learning. The APEF survived the first two years despite the linear-based decisions, actions, and policies of Generals Merritt and Otis; delayed establishment of clearly defined political and military shared visions concerning the fate of the Philippines; and inability to suspend mental models concerning the insurgents and Filipinos. It took another two years for the APEF to prosper from a dynamic environment and accomplish the political objective of pacification. Primarily due to the intuitive wisdom and personal internalization of the five disciplines on the part of Major General MacArthur, the APEF was able to achieve generative learning. The command climate he created allowed the APEF to truly and quickly learn how to simultaneously quell the insurgency, win the hearts and minds of the Filipinos, and establish American civil government.

Thus, using the learning organization concept as analytical framework offers a different approach to uncovering a deeper understanding of military failures and successes. It provides an intangible, intellectual, and cognitive systems-based explanation of a historical achievement and failure despite the fact that the learning organization concept was not known until now. Nevertheless, discovering this type of explanation provides profound and insightful perspectives for the future.

The analysis of the APEF experience generates implications for military planners applicable to the future. For the most part, these implications are not new but nevertheless validate recurring themes and lessons. First, military operations require systems-based thinking and planning. A lesson that emerged from the reconstruction of the South (following the American Civil War from 1865 to 1877) and again in the Philippine War, was the reality that a military government and presence of troops were not enough to facilitate “tremendous political, social, and psychological transformations in people, no matter how desirable the changes might be.”¹⁶³ In many ways, the Philippine War was more complex than the reconstruction of the South as the threatening existence of significant resistance posed by the Filipino insurgents had negative repercussion toward the establishment of an American colony and implementation of pacification. Both conflicts clearly demonstrate military operations are indeed very complex.

The human dimension within the spectrums of military operations ranging from conventional to unconventional to SASO add to the complexity and chaos. The various thinking and interactions among human beings that make up the military, enemy, government, society and other groups of people who contribute to the problem are nonlinear and unpredictable. The application of military force, direct or indirect, based on time, space, combat power, and purpose must take into account the non-linearity of people in order to develop innovative and creative approaches. Examining the thinking and interactions of the enemy is important to understanding the total complex nature of a systems (military) problem. Compelling an enemy to do one's will is a complex outcome.

Second, establishing political vision followed by military vision is critical to the initial stages of planning. When the development of a political vision parallels the execution of military operations, the negative effects at the tactical to strategic levels are devastating. Declaring political and military visions should precede planning and execution and keep pace with reality and evolving events. Military planners do not necessarily have direct influence in the development of political vision. Building shared and supporting military visions are significantly difficult to do without political vision. In SASO, political vision translated into clear and well-defined strategic military objectives will probably be an exception rather than the rule in the future.¹⁶⁴

Third, the personal mastery of soldiers from the U.S. Army active, national guard, and reserves together make up a highly competent and flexible military. In the case of SASO, particularly in nation building and humanitarian operations, the non-military background, experience, and skills of soldiers are significant. In many ways, the national guard and reserves by the nature of their dual military and civilian background make them ideally suited to executing certain types of SASO. Lawyers, teachers, civil engineers, and doctors, to name a few, contributed greatly in establishing both the military and civil government in the Philippines. "The great ability of the army officer corps [active and reserves] was one of the reasons for the success in organizing and administering the military government."¹⁶⁵ The Army benefited from the diversity that existed within the ranks.

Fourth, the APEF and other military conflicts warn that capitalism, democracy, and the American way of life are not a cure all to global problems. Nor are they valued by other cultures and nations the way Americans do. Perhaps, some people, culture, and

religion, by their own nature, are incompatible to the American way of life. They are unable to see or accept the advantages of an American form of democratic government.¹⁶⁶ This warning is perhaps the most recurring lessons throughout American military history. Planners need to be aware of this mental model: Americanization is the cure all.

Fifth, team learning stimulates initiative and innovation at all levels.¹⁶⁷ Learning spontaneously occur when senior leaders foster a climate of open and frank dialogue and discussion, and allow subordinate leaders the freedom to execute missions. So much so that the collective generative learning that occurs, produces processes and systems which further enhances an organization's capacity to learn. Just as was in the case of the APEF, intelligence and counterintelligence operations can both achieve tactical adaptability and generative learning.¹⁶⁸ Captain Ballance and Lieutenant Johnston's work significantly contributed to the APEF's team learning. Learning faster benefits the team, much to the dismay of the enemy. Even in the most advanced technological age, in battle, leaders will continue to rely on the intuition, judgment, and skill of soldiers on the ground. The challenge of all leaders is to allow soldiers and units to learn as much as possible before the first bullet is fired. Team learning allows them to come up with those generative processes before the battle which is critically vital.

Lastly, in SASO, the military effort will be supplemented with diplomatic efforts on the ground. Both make up that "U.S., joint, or coalition team." Too often discord between diplomatic and military efforts is a result of key individual diplomatic and military leaders' varying strong personalities. Conflict of personalities is a source of emotional tension. Effective and efficient cooperation, putting aside personality differences, and controlling emotional tension are truly required in a diplomatic-military

team learning in future SASO.¹⁶⁹ As Senge would say, focusing on the creative tension and less on emotional tension can help facilitate cooperation.

To assimilate these implications, military planners, as this study indicates, must internalize and practice the five disciplines. In doing so, they stand to benefit from the resulting innovative and creative processes and systems required to deal with the complex and chaotic nature of military operations. The art and practice of the five learning disciplines enables military planners to approach new challenges in a comprehensive cognitive and systematic manner. As the APEF's experience in the Philippines in 1899 to 1902 illustrates, bringing about a military learning organization is the key to dealing with the complexity and chaos of 21st century military operations.

As the American forces enter the 21st century, they need a reliable approach to ensure they are continually learning and learning faster than any potential adversary. Learning, as the five disciplines facilitates, enables military organizations to effectively deal with all complex and chaotic bands within the spectrum of military operations. Therefore, based on this study, bringing about a military learning organization through the internalization and practice of Senge's five disciplines is the reliable and vital strategy for the future. For it is the army that quickly learns how to compel an enemy to do its will who will most likely consistently achieve success and mission accomplishment.

In Search of a Military Learning Organization

In light of the conclusion of this study, exploring the utility and application of the learning organization concept and the five disciplines presents other potential research. Consider the following four prospects. First, the concept, disciplines, and idea of adaptive and generative learning can be used as an analytical framework to examine

failures and successes of other military conflicts. Developing deeper insights to military failures and successes will be beneficial. Second, the intangible human dimension of battle command, perhaps, could be explained through a transformation of the five disciplines. The topic of battle command is a complex concept that may be further understood through human-based concepts like the five disciplines. Third, identifying the learning disabilities of a division or corps battle staff that prevent adaptive and generative learning may give insights to developing a battle staff training program. When a battle staff is unable to effectively and efficiently function, both the unit and commander suffer. Discovering what disables a battle staff offers great insights to both leaders and staff officers. Lastly, the question of how the five disciplines allow military planners to apply operational art and to develop creative and innovative plans against a complex political and military conflict, also presents an interesting research topic.

¹ Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization Audio Tapes (Abridged) (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Audio Publishing, 1994) Part One, Side One. Through years of research author and his team of colleagues created and developed the concept of "learning organization" and the disciplines associated with the concept. Author uses the label "learning organization" to describe a state of being, condition, or modus operandi. He specifically presents the learning organization as a concept or vision not as something to become or arrive at, but a continuous progression where learning is a central core of all organizational functions and foundation-- when and where learning is manifested in all actions, behavior, and results of individuals and the organization they belong.

² Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 3.

³ Michael J. Marquardt, Building the Learning Organization: A Systems Approach to Quantum Improvement and Global Success (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), p. 15. This is a "how to" book and expands on Senge's learning organization concept and disciplines. Building on Senge's ideas, the author proposes a systems-linked learning organization model that incorporates five distinct subsystems of learning, organization, people, knowledge, and technology. His model recognizes learning, the core subsystem of a learning organization, occurs at the individual, group, and organizational levels. The quality and impact of the learning is enhanced and augmented by the subsystems of organization, people, knowledge and technology. He differs with Senge by attaching the aspect of technology to his model. This monograph uses Marquardt's certain definitions when they add on but still consistent with Senge's ideas.

⁴ G. Scott Gorman, "Adapting to Chaos: American Soldiers in Siberia, 1918-1920." (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS], United States Army Command and General Staff College [USACGSC], 1998). Convincing research in revealing the elements of American forces' tactical

adaptability within a complex and chaotic military operations other than war (MOOTW) environment of the 1918-1920 American military intervention in Siberia. Research explores and applies complex and chaos theories to understand how American forces tactically adapted in Siberia in 1918 to 1920. As one of his premise, author convincingly argues military operations and systems are complex and chaotic. Further, military problems require a non-linear and systems approach. Author concludes, intelligence, command and control, leadership, and information operations formed methods by which tactical adaptability was gained by the American military in Siberia. He fails to clearly differentiate and convincingly argue these forms of adaptability are generative learning in nature.

⁵ Ibid, p. 41. The American intervention in Siberia is one example that supports the notion of learning as a vital core to adapting to a complex and chaotic military environment. Author states, "Military adaptation was essential for mission success in Siberia. In a continuous loop of *learning* about threats in the environment, anticipation of the future operational conditions, and adaptation for those conditions, the military system sought to provide itself advantage over its environment."

⁶ In his book, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968) Ludwig von Bertalanffy defines a system (pp. 54-55) "as a set of elements standing in interrelations. Interrelation means that elements, p, stand in relations, R, so that the behavior of an element p in R is different from its behavior in another relation, R'." In his book, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) M. Mitchell Waldrop gives meaning to the statement of "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" when he states on p. 11, "a system that is complex, in the sense that a great many independent agents are interacting with each other in a great many ways." He continues on p. 12, "Complex systems are more spontaneous, more disorderly, more alive than that. At the same time, however, their peculiar dynamism is also a far cry from the weirdly unpredictable gyrations known as chaos."

⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman's Library, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 83. Clausewitz states, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." Glenn E. James' "Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications," The Newport Papers Tenth in the Series, (Newport: Naval War College, 1996) provides excellent insights to integrating chaos theory in military decision making process and military analysis. Author translate the scientific aspects of chaos theory into military application in an easy to understand and readable argument.

⁸ United States Army Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993), pp. 14-1 to 14-5.

⁹ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990). Authors conclude military misfortunes occur from military forces failure to learn, anticipate, and adapt. Uses experience of American in their 1942 antisubmarine warfare, Israel Defense Forces in the 1973 Suez Front and the Golan Heights, British at Gallipoli in August 1915, American defeat in November-December 1950 period of the Korean War, and French Army and Air Force in May-June 1940 as case studies and evidences to support their conclusion. From their thesis, authors define *learning* as a process of gaining knowledge and insights from the past or experience.

¹⁰ Senge, The Fifth Discipline Audio.

¹¹ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, pp. 14, and 52-54. Author states, "...it is not enough merely to survive. 'Survival learning' or what is more often termed 'adaptive learning' is important—indeed it is necessary. But for a learning organization, 'adaptive learning' must be joined by 'generative learning,' learning that enhances our capacity to create."

¹² Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: United States TRADOC, 1 August 1994), p. 4-11, states, "Our Army since 1989 has evolved to become a learning organization. This idea allows our Army to assimilate growth much more rapidly even while conducting current operations. Force XXI is a concept for a learning organization. It calls for major philosophical, theoretical, materiel, and organizational changes—from how we think about war, to how we fight and lead on future battlefields and succeed in OOTW [operations other than war]." There are no military publications on what it truly means, what it is to be, how to be, and skills of a learning organization in the military, specifically the U.S. Army, realm. This monograph is the first attempt. For further reading on prospects and potential application of learning organization concepts in the military see the following SAMS monographs: Harry C. Glenn, "Building the Tactical Nerve Center: Enhancing Battalion Commander and Staff Performance in the Tactical Decision Making Process," SAMS, USACGSC, 1997;

Jack L. Gumbert, II, "Learning Organizations and Operational-Level Leadership," SAMS, USACGSC, 1996; Marion L. Miles, Jr., "Fighting Without Boundaries: Unleashing Initiative on the Tactical Battlefield," SAMS, USACGSC, 1996; and Brian D. Prosser, "The Need for Training for Uncertainty," SAMS, USACGSC, 1997.

¹³ Senge, Peter M. The Dance of Change: The Challenges of Sustaining Momentum in Learning Organizations. (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 1999), p. 16. Senge states, "The capacity of a human community to shape its future, and specifically to sustain the significant processes of change required to do so."

¹⁴ See United States Army Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership (Washington: HQ, Department of the Army, 1999).

¹⁵ Senge, The Dance of Change, p. 18.

¹⁶ Cohen and Gooch, p. 236.

¹⁷ Richard W. Mills, "The Philippine Insurrection: America's First Venture into Military Operations Other Than War," Thesis, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 13 June 1997), p.7. See also Sam C. Sarkesian, American's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 37-56, 127-136, and 165-182.

¹⁸ Quoted in Marquardt's Building a Learning Organization on p. 15.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 1-17.

²⁰ Ibid. See also James Gleick's Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 68.

²¹ See Ludwig von Bertalanffy's General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications; James Gleick's Chaos; and L. Douglas Kiel and Euel Elliott's (editors) Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997). These references provide excellent description of how systems thinking and non-linearity emerged and continues to emerge as a new science for the next century. They also offer an elaboration and application of chaos theory in various fields, such as social science, political science, economics, management, and physical science. Each recognizes a pattern and order from the behavior or response of complex and chaotic nature of systems.

²² Ibid.

²³ See Robert M. Fulmer and J. Bernard Keys, "A Conversation with Peter Senge: New Developments in Organizational Learning," in *Organizational Dynamics*, Autumn 1998, Volume 27, Issue 2, pp. 33-43.

²⁴ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, p. 14. He states, "Real learning gets to the heart of what it means to be human." Further, through learning, a group of people is able to do something it never was able to do, re-perceive the world and its relationship to it, and extend its capacity to create, to be part of the generative process of life.

²⁵ Senge, The Fifth Discipline Audio.

²⁶ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, p. 139 and Marquardt, p. 32. Both authors stress the value of people's capacity to learn and how it is a precursor to organizational learning. In Marquardt's book, on p. 19, he makes a distinction between organizational learning and learning organization stating, "In discussing learning organizations, we are focusing on the what, and describing the systems, principles, and characteristic of organizations that learn and produce as a collective entity. Organizational learning, on the other hand, refers to how organizational learning occurs, i.e., the skills and processes of building and utilizing knowledge. Organizational learning as such is just one dimension or element of a learning organization."

²⁷ Peter F. Drucker, "The New Society of Organizations," in Robert Howard and Robert D. Haas, The Learning Imperative: Managing People for Continuous Innovation (Boston: Harvard Business Review, 1990), p. 11. Drucker states, "All organizations now say routinely, 'People are our greatest asset.'"

²⁸ To Marquardt (p. 43), Senge's five disciplines are necessary skills to maximize organizational learning and "to facilitate the transition of a company to a learning organization." He adds dialogue as the sixth necessary discipline or skill.

²⁹ Marquardt, p. 19. Author's own definition of a learning organization is closely similar to Senge's definition. See also Fred Kofman and Peter M. Senge, "Communities of Commitment: The Heart of Learning Organizations," in Sarita Chawla and John Renesch (editors), Learning Organizations: Developing Cultures for Tomorrow's Workplace (Portland: Productivity Press, 1995), p. 31-32. See also Robert M. Fulmer and J. Bernard Keys, "A Conversation with Peter Senge: New Developments in Organizational Learning," pp. 33-43. All references state there is no such thing as a "Learning

Organization." It is a vision or medium that "describes a type of organization people would truly like to work within and which can thrive in a world of increasing interdependency and change. It is not what the vision is, but what the vision does that matters." What the vision does helps create a desired future outcome. This monograph strictly adheres to Senge's concepts as written in the Fifth Discipline and Dance of Change. While Marquardt provides another perspectives, his definition and ideas are not necessary in paralleled with Senge's concepts. The notion that an organization never "arrives" at as a learning organization is what this study abides by. Since learning is a continuous process and complexity is always increasing, an organization never really arrive but can exist with functionality or state of being of a learning organization. The organization does *this*; thereby achieve adaptive and generative learning, through the internalization and practice of the five disciplines. The disciplines are not necessary skills as Marquardt states. They are actions that require discipline and commitment to do. Senge vehemently convinced his publisher of The Fifth Discipline not to force him to write a "how to" book, because again a learning organization is never arrive at. It is a generative vision that facilitates learning. Similarly, this monograph is not focused on "how to" but rather focuses on explains the path taken through vision—a vision that is a manifestation of the learning disciplines.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, pp. 71-72.

³² Ibid., p. 72.

³³ See Peter M. Senge, Art Kleiner, Charlotte Roberts, Richard B. Ross, and Bryan J. Smith, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 1994), pp. 87-113, and Marquardt, pp. 43-44, for further examples and understanding of shift of mind and systems thinking.

³⁴ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, Appendix 2, pp. 378-390, provides descriptions of all system archetypes.

See also, Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, pp. 149-168.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 94.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 150-155. Senge explains, "Creative tension is not emotional tension. Creative tension *doesn't feel*, it exist in that moment when we hold in our mind a vision and see what exist does not look the same as our vision."

³⁸ Marquardt, p. 44. In his article, "Teaching Smart People How to Learn," Robert Howard (editor) The Learning Imperative: Managing People for Continuous Innovation (Boston: Harvard Business Review, 1990), p. 177, Chris Argyris states, "But if learning is to persist, managers and employees must also look inward. They need to reflect critically on their own behavior, identify the ways they often inadvertently contribute to the organization's problems, and then change how they act. In particular, they must learn how the very way they go about defining and solving problems can be a source of problems in its own right."

³⁹ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, p. 206.

⁴² Ibid., p. 236. See also Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, pp. 351-434.

⁴³ Clausewitz, p. 173.

⁴⁴ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, p. 14.

⁴⁵ In his article, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902." Pacific Historical Review 52, no. 4 (1983): 353-377. Glenn A. May reminds us, "The Vietnam War has reminded us that the possession of superior military and economic power does not guarantee victory."

⁴⁶ John A. English, Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), pp. 9-28. Author asserts mass armies emerged due to technological, organizational, and political reasons. Addressing political considerations, he states (p.18), "The doubling of the size of the French army from 80,000 in the 1590s to 150,000 in the 1630s can also be explained in terms of policy, specifically, the entry of France into the Thirty Years' War, which was a hotly contested domestic political issue at the time. Once this decision was taken, enemy numbers fielded for whatever reason had roughly to be matched, for, according to Brigadier Shelford Bidwell writing in a later age, there have only ever been two principles of war: superior numbers and the command and control that brings them effectively to bear."

⁴⁷ Steven T. Ross, "Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare," in the Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987, edited by Harry R. Borowski (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United

States Air Force, 1988), 309-24; excerpt reprinted in USACGSC, C600 Part 1 Syllabus/Book of Readings (For Leavenworth: USACGSC, July 1998), p. 103.

⁴⁸ S.J. Lewis, "Reflections on German Military Reform," in Military Review 68 (August 1988): 60-69; reprinted in USACGSC, C600 Terms II and III Syllabus/Book of Readings (For Leavenworth: USACGSC, AY 1998-1999), p. 77. Author concludes, "The [German] army's specific problems involved several organizational flaws and poor unit performance in these critical areas: discipline, tactical errors, a general lethargy, camouflage, reconnaissance, security and fire discipline. These flaws were the result of the excessively rapid military expansion following 1935 and the consequential inexperience of the junior and mid-level officers. These flaws could only be corrected by a major training effort."

⁴⁹ Cohen and Gooch, p. 233.

⁵⁰ Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1978), p. 173. Author quotes Manstein's reflection of the 1939 German success over Poland, "It is, perhaps, interesting that von Manstein, while recognizing that 'A vital factor in the speed of...success was the unorthodox [sic] use of big, self-sufficient tank formations supported by a far superior Air Force', nevertheless believed that what was decisive was the 'spirit' of the ordinary German fighting soldiers and their staffs: 'In the German Wehrmacht it had been found possible, with the help of new means of warfare, to reacquire [author's italics] the true art of leadership in mobile operations...right down to the most junior NCO or infantryman, and in this lay the reason for our success.'"

⁵¹ Cohen and Gooch, p. 235. Authors assert the most valuable lessons come from a study of other organizations and how they operate. "Yet, these are the most difficult lessons to cull, because they are the least tangible." To support the notion of intangible lessons and attributes, authors refer to Herbert Rosinski's conclusion that the real secrets of what made the German Command and Staff System efficiently effective in 1930's were their "certain almost intangible qualities of intellectual training and outlook." Rosinski was "a German émigré who had taught at the German Naval War College during the 1930's and recommended to the American government during World War II that the United States undertake a large scale effort to study the German general staff."

⁵² Brian Bond, "Battle of France," from Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air, edited by Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (New York: David McKay Co., 1976), pp. 101-113, reprinted in USACGSC, C600 Terms II and III Syllabus/Book of Readings (For Leavenworth: USACGSC, AY 1998-1999), pp. 86-92. Author begins with, "In the history of warfare few campaigns between great and approximately equal powers have been decided so swiftly and conclusively as the German conquest of Western Europe in May and June 1940."

⁵³ Cohen and Gooch, p. 235. Authors state, "Military organizations can and in many cases do learn very quickly."

⁵⁴ FM 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1999), pp. 2-1 to 2-28. On p. 2-5, in discussing respects as one of the Army's values the manual states, "In the Army, respect means recognizing and appreciating the inherent dignity and worth of all people. This value reminds you that your people are your greatest resource." On p. 2-14, the manual highlights intelligence as a required mental attribute of an Army leader, stating, "Intelligent leaders think, learn, and reflect; then they apply what they learn...All people have some intellectual ability that, when developed, allows them to analyze and understand a situation." It recognizes how an individual's "intellectual development applies directly to battlefield success."

⁵⁵ Eric K. Shinseki, General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War." Available online: 30 November 1999. [<http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/vision.htm>]

⁵⁶ This statement is part of a speech President McKinley gave to convince anti-imperialist politicians to support imperial expansionist policy in the Philippines. This is a speech cited in General Douglas MacArthur's personal biography, Reminiscences (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985- a reprint of New York: McGraw Hill, 1964 publication of Reminiscences), pp. 19-20. General Douglas MacArthur was a son of Major General Arthur MacArthur. Major General Arthur MacArthur served in the Philippines from 1898 to 1901. General Douglas MacArthur highly regarded this speech when he wrote, "I cannot tell you how profound an impression this speech made upon me. Little did I dream, however, that nearly fifty years later it was to guide my conduct in the occupation of a defeated enemy's country."

⁵⁷ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present, Fourth Edition (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), pp. 950, 994-1001, 950, 1106-

1107 (1106 "However, thanks to General Arthur MacArthur's wise and just military rule, the Christian Filipinos were gradually won over (1903). Karl Irving Faust's Campaigning in the Philippines (San Francisco: Hicks-Judd, 1899) provides excellent narration of the first two years of American forces in the Philippines. Completed and extracted American and Filipino National letters, policies, orders, speeches, and proclamations are smoothly integrated throughout the book. Published in 1899, the book provides insights to American perspectives at the time.

⁵⁸ Faust, pp. 18-30.

⁵⁹ John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krag: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 1-42. In these pages, author brings out the theme of President McKinley's slow formulation of a coherent, clearly defined Philippine policy. Author concludes that the evolution of U.S. policy over the Philippines failed to keep up with the events the U.S. Army faced. This conclusion is collaborated in Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 7. Many other historians agree and recognize President McKinley's slow formulation and declaration of Philippine policy added greater difficulty in the conduct of both diplomatic and military operations. See also Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 3-23.

⁶⁰ Edwin Wildman, former Vice and Deputy Consul-General at Hong Kong and war correspondent during the Filipino Revolt, Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino Ambitions (Boston: Lothrop Publisher Company, 1914), pp. 79-80. Wildman explains he and consul Williams and Pratt believed if they had not arranged with Aguinaldo to cooperate, Aguinaldo "would have returned to the Islands of his own accord, and undertaken independent operations, which might have caused us serious embarrassment at the time." Ironically, author's concerns became a reality anyways.

⁶¹ Welch, pp. 3-4. Author asserts, "Dewey was at Manila Bay because the Navy Department had in the period June 1896-June 1897 fashioned various contingency plans for a possible war against Spain, and in each plan an attack on Manila had been projected." See Brian G. Aldridge, "Drive Them Until They Drop and Then Civilize Them: The United States Army and Indigenous Populations, 1866-1902," thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, 1995), p. 120. Aldridge cites David Healy, U.S. Expansion: The Imperialistic Urge in the 1890's, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 57-58 as a source indicating early war plans looked into military operations in the Philippines.

⁶² Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 5-6. Author describes, "Emilio Aguinaldo, a twenty-seven-year-old Tagalog principal from Kawit, Cavite. Aguinaldo joined the [Katipunans] society in 1895 and used his position as a civic official to recruit and organize a Katipunan faction loyal to him. When the revolt began, he raised a guerrilla band, assumed the title of general, and soon controlled much of eastern Cavite." Dissension within the Katipunan and assassination of Andres Bonifacio, original leader of the Katipunan, weaken their independence movement. Aguinaldo was defeated in Cavite by the Spaniards in 1897 but refused to surrender. Instead, he reorganized his followers into a village militia that he called the Sandahatan. He called for guerrilla tactics and protracted war. The Spaniards were able to convince Aguinaldo to sign an agreement to end his resistance in lieu of a Pact of Biac na bato that declared Philippine independence. Aguinaldo also agreed to be exiled in Hong Kong and received 400,000 pesos in return. Despite his departure, loyal Katipunans and nationalists continued their independence movement.

⁶³ Gates, p. 15.

⁶⁴ Gates, p. 4. Author writes, "He [Dewey] estimated the size of the Spanish force at 10,000 men, and he mentioned the presence of approximately 30,000 Philippine revolutionaries whom he thought would act in cooperation with the Americans."

⁶⁵ Faust, p. 33.

⁶⁶ Aldridge, p. 120.

⁶⁷ Faust, pp. 44 and 119. Faust provides a translation of Aguinaldo's 6 January 1899 statement and response to President McKinley's 21 December 1898 declaration of U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines. In it Aguinaldo stated, "I thought I would get my independence, as I was promised by the Consul-General of Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and it would come in a formal, assured, friendly proclamation by the American generals who had entered these waters."

⁶⁸ Long after the Philippine War, consuls and Admiral Dewey later wrote in books and stated in interviews that Aguinaldo's arrogance and ignorance led himself in believing Americans would help him establish his

presidency and immediate Philippine independence. In his book, Aguinaldo, former Consul Wildman defended himself and Admiral Dewey, stating it was a good idea to solicit Aguinaldo's cooperation and they never promised Aguinaldo an independent Philippine Republic under his presidency (see pp. 79-83 and 373-374). See also Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp-283-284. Author provides insights to President McKinley's decisions on whether or not to annex the Philippines (see pp. 323- 365). See also Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 326-449.

⁶⁹ Ibid. See also Gates, pp. 17-18. Author uses official records to cite the chronological events.

⁷⁰ Linn, p. 7. Author provides an example of how the lack of both political and military coherent visions affected operations on the ground. Linn writes about General Anderson's, the first senior officer to land in the Philippines, first encounter with the Philippine Insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. He narrates, "He [Anderson] was able to settle the supply problem and arrange for his soldiers to take over a section of trenches before Manila, but, since he was unaware of McKinley's ultimate plans, he was unable to dispel Filipino suspicions. All he could do was refuse to recognize Aguinaldo's government and accept Aguinaldo's refusal to place himself under American authority."

⁷¹ Ibid. Author provides an excellent summary giving insight to the development of the confusion within the Filipino minds concerning Aguinaldo's self proclaimed presidency and American occupation. He writes, "Dewey had arranged for Aguinaldo's return, he distributed captured arms to the revolutionaries, and he made no objection to Aguinaldo's 24 May assumption of dictatorial powers, his 12 June proclamation of Philippine independence, or his 24 June arrogation of the presidency of the revolutionary government. To the revolutionaries, Dewey's actions seemed to indicate that the United States recognized Aguinaldo's legitimacy as a national leader. Thus, even before the arrival of Merritt's forces, relations between Americans and Filipinos were fraught with potential dissension."

⁷² May, p. 361-362. Author compares American leaders to Aguinaldo and his leaders and concludes experience, competence, and skills were an American advantage.

⁷³ In his book, The General's General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 179, Kenneth R. Young provides good summarized descriptions of the senior officers under General Merritt. He writes, "The 8th Army Corps commander was Major General Merritt, a sixty-two-year-old, overweight, gray-haired veteran of the Civil War. A West Point graduate, class of 1860, Merritt had won fame during that war and reached the rank of brevet major general of the Volunteers before he was thirty. He was not happy at being assigned to lead the Philippine Expedition; as the second-ranking general in the U.S. Army after General Miles, he believed he, rather than General Shafter, should have been placed in charge of the Cuban Expedition. Major General Elwell S. Otis (a sixty-one-year-old veteran of the Civil War and a former commander of the Infantry and Cavalry Training School at Fort Leavenworth) was second in command of the 8th Army Corps. A stickler for paperwork, Otis was a tall, balding, taciturn officer with white muttonchop sideburns. Besides Charlie King and [Arthur] MacArthur, Francis V. Greene was the other brigadier general. Like King, he was a graduate of West Point, class of 1870, who had resigned his commission but had returned to active duty as a Volunteer for the duration of the [Spanish] war." Arthur MacArthur was a Civil War hero at twenty-four and a newly promoted brigadier general in the Volunteers when selected to command one of General Merritt's brigades. Young describes MacArthur in his book, "He had served in the Regular Army for thirty-two years, studying and training for the possibility of war. At fifty-two years of age, MacArthur was an autodidactic officer knowledgeable in military affairs, political sciences, and law."

⁷⁴ Gates, p. 64. Author cites from a foreign observer, "men drawn from every rank of society, lawyers, merchants, postal clerks, tradesmen, office hands of all descriptions, university men;" and, indeed, it would be difficult to say what trade or calling is not represented. From amongst these men it was possible to draw fairly proficient officials."

⁷⁵ May, p. 375. Author claims, "Not surprisingly, the volunteers who fought in the Philippines in 1900 were considerably more enthusiastic about their task than the draftees who fought in Vietnam several decades later. Not surprisingly, the families of the volunteers of 1900 were less inclined to question the policies of the government than the families of the conscripts of the 1960s and 1970s."

⁷⁶ Gates, p. 55. Author states that in May 1898 President McKinley's instructions on how General Merritt and his forces would conduct its "government of occupation."

⁷⁷ Faust, pp. 117-118. Author provides exact content of President McKinley's 21 December 1898 U.S. Sovereignty in the Philippines. In it, the President describes the intent of benevolent assimilation stating,

"Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule." Gates, on pp. 55-56, also states, "It was to insure the security of the inhabitants in their persons and property and to make them understand that the American troops had not come to make war upon the people of the Philippines but to protect them. According to the President's instructions, the occupation was to be as free from severity as possible." He concludes, "In short, the President wanted General Merritt to set up as benevolent and liberal a military government as was possible given the wartime conditions that he expected would prevail. His instructions established a basis for the complete development of military government in the Philippines."

⁷⁸ Sarkesian, p. 169.

⁷⁹ Linn, p. 8. Author writes, "Faced with starvation and fearing a bloodbath if the revolutionaries broke into the city, the Spanish commander resolved this impasse by agreeing to surrender after token resistance if the Americans would keep the Filipinos out. The resulting Battle of Manila on 13 August contained enough gunfire and casualties to satisfy both Spanish and American honor." In his essay, Julius J. Jorgensen, Jr. "Historical Analysis of the United States Army: 1898 to 1916," United States Army War College, 1972, he finds, "The governor-general of the Spanish Forces in the city [of Manila], recognizing the hopelessness of the tactical situation, proposed that a mock battle be arranged, (in order to save Spanish honor).

⁸⁰ Welch, p. 5.

⁸¹ Gates, p. 22.

⁸² Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 1-3 October 1980, Edited by Joe C. Dixon (United States: U.S. Air Force, 1980), p. 83. Presenter expresses, "Literally from the moment they occupied Manila, American officers had begun efforts to reform the city's government and improve the lives of the people in their charge, initiating their work at a time when they assumed that the United States would not be retaining the islands." This conclusion reinforces the notion of the APEF's commitment to do the best of their abilities to do a job without clearly defined national objectives.

⁸³ Leech, p. 345. Author states, "The Philippine inhabitants, to the President's mind, meant primarily the rural population of impoverished and largely illiterate peasants. They called up a rather nebulous picture—they were known only by hearsay to the Americans at Manila—but McKinley felt sure of one or two characteristics, besides their political backwardness. He had learned from John Foreman's article that they were sensitive and pliant, and that, while they had been outraged by Spanish oppression, they could be easily molded by a just and merciful government. It did not disturb the President's picture that the Tagalog warriors were also inhabitants. He considered them a lawless faction, greedy for loot, and totally distinct from and inimical to the gentle, peace-loving masses."

⁸⁴ Wildman, p. 78. Author provides his own mental model of the Filipinos who he referred to Malays stating, "But most of us misunderstood the character of the Malays, and in the end perhaps it is as well that we did. Had we been acquainted with their misdeveloped natures, their cunning deception and unreasonableness or lack of reasonableness, our eyes would have been blinded to their better qualities and their possibilities. So our ignorance of their character and their ignorance of ours gave grounds for the misunderstandings that quickly followed the establishment of Aguinaldo in his patria."

⁸⁵ Gates, p. 174. Author cites, "Some Americans refused to trust any Filipino and began to assume that the whole population was actively in league against them. As one officer observed, 'it is the same old story—if U.S. troops are strong, it is 'mucho amigo'; if weak, it is cruel death.'" By the time this observation was made, "gugu" had replaced "nigger" as the soldier's universal term of reference for the Filipinos, and in the eyes of many soldiers all "gugus" looked and acted alike."

⁸⁶ May, p. 361.

⁸⁷ Leech, pp. 344-345. Author highlights the consternation President McKinley experienced in deciding what to do with the Philippines. It also gives insights to certain bias he and his advisors shared. Young cites, "After fluctuating on his position for months, President McKinley finally decided in favor of annexation in late November. He explained his decision to a Christian delegation visiting the White House. 'The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans. I thought first

we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then the other islands. I walked the floor of the White House night after night, and I am not ashamed to tell you that I went down on my knees and prayed to the Almighty God for light and guidance. And one night it came to me. We could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; we could not turn them over to France or Germany, that would be bad business; we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government and they would have anarchy and misrule. There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then, I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly.” See also Young, p. 213. Young concludes, “A compromise was negotiated to save Spanish honor—the United States agreed to pay Spain \$20 million for the Philippines. On December 10, 1898, the delegates in Paris initialed the settlement.”

⁸⁸ Aldridge, p. 130.

⁸⁹ Gates, p. 76. See also Faust, pp. 118-119. Faust cites from Aguinaldo's 6 January 1899 statement, “My government cannot remain indifferent in a view of violent and aggressive usurpation of its territory by a people who claim to be the champions of liberty, and so it is determined to begin hostilities if the American forces intend to get, by force, the occupation of Visayas.”

⁹⁰ Linn, Brian M. “Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902.” Intelligence and National Security, Vol 6, no. 1 (1991): 90-114, p. 93.

⁹¹ Gates, on p. 25 author states, “Misleading and conflicting reports from the Far East misrepresented conditions in the islands, and the President arrived at his decision with little or no insight into the actual state of affairs there.” On p. 34, author writes, “Americans in both Washington and the Philippines continued to believe that the problem could be solved without recourse to violence. They hoped that the Filipinos might accept American sovereignty once they recognized the benevolent intentions of the United States.” In addition to these statements, Gates further supplemented his conclusions that President McKinley was ill informed by stating, “No matter how indecisive the President's actions had been, he was not completely responsible for the conditions existing in the island at the end of 1898. General Otis misled his Commander in Chief as much as the American consuls had misled the President at an earlier date.” In Stuart Creighton Miller's, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 82-90, author cites the circumstances surrounding General Otis' role in censoring the media.

⁹² Miller, pp. 133-135. See also Gates, p. 39-40. Gates implies President McKinley wanted another entity in the Philippines who can foster the American interest in “improving the condition of the inhabitants, securing them peace, liberty, and the pursuit of their highest good.” On p. 141, Gates describes the commission, “The commission consisted of Judge William Howard Taft (leader), “General Luke E. Wright, a Civil War veteran and Memphis lawyer; Henry Clay Ide, a leading Vermont lawyer who had been chief Justice of Samoa in 1891; Bernard Moses, a professor of history and political economy at the University of California; and Dean C. Worcester of the first Philippine commission.”

⁹³ Linn, “Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,” p. 93. Author claims, “With no adequate intelligence apparatus, Otis was unaware that the revolutionaries had abandoned their attempt at conventional ‘civilized’ warfare and adopted a new strategy that would be far more effective...no longer seeking victory on the battlefield; henceforth they [insurgents] would wear the Americans down, relying on disease, terrain, and frustration to demoralize the soldiers.”

⁹⁴ The whole ordeal of pacifying the Philippines was indeed a complex scenario for the US Army at the time. In Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism, pp. 24-25, author concludes, “The American army, for its part, faced a difficult and in some ways unprecedented task. Never before had Americans fought outside North America; in the Philippines they would fight in jungle terrain 7,000 miles from home. Excepting perhaps the wars against the Indians, the U.S. army had never sought to subjugate a people who laid claim to national independence. Now it would be required not only to subjugate but also to pacify the Filipinos; not only to defeat them in battle but also to make them accept American rule. The wonder is not that the war lasted for forty-one months but that it did not last longer.” In his book, America's Forgotten Wars, Sarkesian adds (p. 37), “it was more complex, longer, and more costly than most people assume.”

⁹⁵ May, p. 361. May argues, “Confronted with a better-trained, better-supplied army, he [Aguinaldo] and his forces suffered a virtually unbroken series of defeats.”

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

⁹⁷ See Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in The Philippine War, 1899-1902.

⁹⁸ Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in The Philippine War, 1899-1902, p. 16. Author concludes, "On 13 November 1899, as the Americans occupied Tarlac, the last capital of the Republic, Aguinaldo had decided to abandon all pretense at conventional tactics and turned completely to guerrilla warfare." In his article, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, Glenn May summarizes this transition: "The Philippine-American War passed through two distinct phases. From February to November 1899, Aguinaldo's army conducted a disastrous conventional campaign against the Americans. Thereafter, the Filipino forces engaged primarily in guerrilla warfare. This second phase of the conflict was brutal on both sides. Filipino guerrillas frequently killed civilians who appeared to be too friendly to the American army of occupation; U.S. soldiers regularly burned barrios that harbored guerrillas and tortured civilians in order to extract information." See also, Gates, pp. 156-178.

⁹⁹ Sarkesian, p. 166. In Linn's, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in The Philippine War, 1899-1902, and "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," author writes the various insurgents types distinguished by motivation and opus operandi leading APEF Commanders to implement tactics and policies which effectively quelled their unique opposing insurgents.

¹⁰⁰ Gates, p. 285. Author states, "At the same time, through continued study, the Americans finally evolved a winning approach to the problem in the form of General MacArthur's new pacification program begun at the end of 1900. What had been needed to fight the guerrilla, as well as develop a colonial government, were patience, dedication, and a willingness to remain on the job for an extremely long time. By the end of the campaign, if nothing else had been learned, Americans knew that many of the problems facing them in the Philippines could not be solved overnight."

¹⁰¹ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, p. 1106.

¹⁰² Gates, p. 239. Author states, "Even after the insular government was transferred to the commission and Taft was appointed civil governor, the military continued to play a key role in the development of civil government at the local level. An order issued on July 20, 1901, gave the army the specific mission of organizing governments in areas still in rebellion and therefore still under military control. Officers charged with the administration of civil affairs in those provinces were considered to be discharging their duties as officers of the insular government, reporting directly to the civil authority, and performing their functions under the direction of the civil governor."

¹⁰³ Linn, p. xii. In his article, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," *Military Affairs* (April 1987):62-66. copyright at 1987 by the American Military Institute. Reproduced in USACGSC, C600 Terms I Syllabus/Book of Readings (For Leavenworth: USACGSC, AY 1999), pp. 347-352, Linn concludes, "American forces faced less a national uprising than a complex regional insurgency in which local and sectional differences were paramount in determining the nature of Philippine resistance... Army officers serving in the provinces may have adapted their counterinsurgency policies to the differing nature of the resistance they faced."

¹⁰⁴ Welch, p. 42.

¹⁰⁵ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, pp. 378-390. Author provides the following descriptions to define the archetypes relevant to this study. "Limits to Growth: A process feeds on itself to produce a period of accelerating growth or expansion. Then the growth begins to slow (often inexplicably to the participants in the system) and eventually comes to a halt, and may even reverse itself and begin an accelerating collapse. The growth phase is caused by a reinforcing feedback process (or by several reinforcing feedback processes). The slowing arises due to a balancing process brought into play as a "limit" is approached. The limit can be a resource constraint, or an external or internal response to growth. The accelerating collapse (when it occurs) arises from the reinforcing process operating in reverse, to generate more and more contraction. **Shifting the Burden:** A short-term "solution" is used to correct a problem, with seemingly positive immediate results. As this correction is used more and more, more fundamental long-term corrective measures are used less and less. Over time, the capabilities for the fundamental solution may atrophy or become disabled, leading to even greater reliance on the symptomatic solution. **Tragedy of the Commons:** Individuals use a commonly available but limited resource solely on the basis of individual need. At first they are rewarded for using it; eventually, they get diminishing returns, which causes them to intensify their efforts. Eventually, the resource is either significantly depleted, eroded, or entirely used up."

¹⁰⁶ Gates, p. 38. "General Otis published his own expertly edited version of the proclamation in which he stressed the benevolent intention of the Americans but declined to mention the question of the

establishment of an American colonial government or the title to the Philippines given the Americans in the Treaty of Paris.”

¹⁰⁷ Gates, p. 18, 24-25, and 37. Author writes Admiral Dewey, General Merritt, Consul E. Spencer Pratt (Department of State Consul Representative in the Far East), Rounseville Wildman (Consul in Hong Kong), Consul Oscar F. Williams (Manila), and even Major General Otis unanimously believed the Filipinos wanted to be an American colony and advised President McKinley to pursue such policy without realizing the significant resistance Aguinaldo and his insurgents could muster.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 7. The APEF faced “an archipelago of more than 7,000 islands inhabited by some 7 million people, many of them hostile.” Author continues on p. 36, “Most important of all, the President ignored, or failed to see, that many Filipinos did not want to be ‘benevolently assimilated’ and that under the leadership of Aguinaldo or the pressure of his government they would be willing to fight before subjecting themselves ‘under the free flay of the United States’.”

¹⁰⁹ Linn’s article, “Intelligence and Low-Intensity conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,” provides the interdependency and interrelationship between the Filipinos and the insurgents as he describes American intelligence effort. See pp. 93-94.

¹¹⁰ Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon,” p. 350.

¹¹¹ Gates, p. 143

¹¹² May, p. 361.

¹¹³ Gates, p. 168. Author provides a comprehensive summary of the shift of burden when he states, “When the Americans tried to protect the municipalities and bring terrorists to trial, they found it almost impossible to obtain witnesses, even though most crimes were committed by one Filipino against another. Townspeople, acting in what appeared to be their own interests, withheld their wholehearted support from either the revolutionaries or the Americans. Instead, they sought to placate both. Avoiding the terror seemed more important than a possible American reaction to their duplicity. Terror effectively blocked American work in the towns and prevented the Army from carrying out President McKinley’s policy of “benevolent assimilation” until the question of sovereignty was settled.”

¹¹⁴ Gates, p. 281

¹¹⁵ Linn, “Intelligence and Low-Intensity conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,” pp. 93-94. Author writes, “The most effective Filipino revolutionary units owed much of their strength to their well developed civilian infrastructure. Often composed of friends or relatives of the guerrilla officers, this invisible government supported the insurgents with food, money, and information.”

¹¹⁶ William Thaddeus Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism. (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 246-247. In his book on p. 137, Miller states, “...the Republican pledge ‘to put down the insurrection’ and ‘to grant the Filipinos the largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties.’ This position was strengthened in September with the publication of the president’s instructions to Taft, which granted to the Filipinos the Bill of Rights, except trial by jury and the right to bear arms, and replaced military rule for civil control in those areas already pacified.” Gates, on p. 142 states, “Secretary of War Elihu Root provided in detail the framework and specific tasks in which Taft’s commission was to establish civil government in the Philippines.”

¹¹⁷ Senge, The Fifth Discipline, author devotes a section on systems thinking (pp. 57-138) and explains how systems thinking allows one to practice the art of “seeing the forest and the trees” and to see the world “primarily from a linear perspective to seeing and acting systemically.”

¹¹⁸ Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, p. 2. Author also writes the high level of competent and experienced leaders, like Major General Elwell S. Otis, Colonel Arthur MacArthur, Colonel Samuel B. Young, and Colonel Funston, served General Merritt well. In his America’s Forgotten Wars, S.C. Sarkesian writes, “The Army entered the Spanish-American War using the Regular Army, state militia, and volunteers.” And concludes, “The forces of the VIII Corps consisted of volunteers and Regulars. The Battle of Manila proved that the volunteers in the American forces could operate effectively when led properly.”

¹¹⁹ Gates, p. 26

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 7.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 5-7. Author states, “The mission of the expeditionary force was vaguely outlined as that of ‘completing the reduction of the Spanish power’ in the islands and maintaining order and security there while they were in the possession of the United States. The President made no mention of whether such

possession, if achieved, would be permanent or temporary. Of particular importance, there was no mention of the revolutionaries and no statement on the type of relationship, if any, the army was expected to have with them. The President said nothing concerning the future disposition of the Philippines should they fall to the Americans."

¹²² Faust, pp. 117-118.

¹²³ Gates, p. 22.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

¹²⁶ Young, p. 179. Young provides insights to Major General's knowledge of the Philippines, he writes, "None of the generals at the staff meeting knew much about the Philippines, and Merritt admitted to the group of assembled officers that he had little information on the current situation in Manila... Further, there were no books on the Philippines in any San Francisco bookstore, and Merritt knew nothing of the history, culture, or geography of the archipelago except for the information available in any encyclopedia."

¹²⁷ May, p. 361. In light of the recorded brutality and cruelty of some American soldiers, author concludes, "If American 'benevolence' played a role in winning the war, it was, at best, a minor role."

¹²⁸ Gates, p. 64.

¹²⁹ Gates, p. 57.

¹³⁰ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image*, (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 19. Author describes Taft's own mental model that is shared by many Americans, "America's imperial effort started out as an exercise in 'self-duplication,' as the historian Glenn May has put it. Taft went to Manila with the preconceived notion that the Filipinos were unsuited to govern themselves, and his first impressions only confirmed his prejudice. 'The great mass of the people are ignorant and superstitious,' he observed, while the few men 'who have any education that deserves the name' were mostly 'intriguing politicians, without the slightest moral stamina, and nothing but personal interests to gratify. They were 'oriental in their duplicity' and, he estimated, it might take a century of training 'before they shall ever realize what Anglo-Saxon liberty is.'"

¹³¹ Linn, "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902," p. 91. Author explains, "He [Major General Otis] lamented that conditions in the Philippines were 'not understood in [the] United States', but he contributed to this misunderstanding by his own confusing and contradictory messages: in one three-day period he described the situation as 'excited', 'improving', and on the verge of open warfare. Although he succeeded in establishing some contacts outside the city, most of his information came from upper-class residents of Manila eager to ingratiate themselves with their new colonial masters. Their reports of Filipino support for American rule, mutinies among Aguinaldo's forces, and factionalism in the newly created Philippine Republic led Otis to underestimate the strength of Aguinaldo's appeal and the power of the revolutionary forces in the provinces. He passed on this unrealistic picture to McKinley, leading the President to conclude that for the good of the Filipinos the United States must annex the islands and restore order. His decision made warfare between the revolutionaries and the American occupiers virtually inevitable."

¹³² Dixon, p. 83. Presenter states, "Later, as tension between the Americans and the Filipino revolutionaries mounted, General E.S. Otis, the commander of the expeditionary force, hoped that the many reforms implemented by his military government would obtain Filipino acceptance of American rule by demonstrating the sincerity of McKinley's pronouncements stressing America's benevolent intentions in the islands. After hostilities began, Otis continued in his belief that enlightened government was a more important tool of pacification than forceful military operations. Even when condemned by some of his own men for being too cautious, Otis persisted in a policy of pacification emphasizing good works instead of more draconian measures, leading one correspondent to remark that the Americans were 'humane to the point of military weakness.'"

¹³³ Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899. Report of the Major-General Command the Army, in three parts. Part 2, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), pp. 162 and 164. Major General Otis writes in his optimistic but inaccurate assessment, "Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and temporarily holding any section of the country... many of these men [insurgents] have deserted the ranks, and now armed, plunder their countrymen who have property or money without discrimination. If communities could be protected against this source of danger and be assured of protection from the outrages that have been committed by the organized insurgent force, formidable opposition to American supremacy would cease. The inhabitants have confidence in the American troops. Even the insurgent leaders take advantage of the humane and charitable policy which the

United States authorities have thus far pursued... The insurgent armed forces are not to be feared except as they oppress their own people and delay returns to conditions of peace."

¹³⁴ Miller, p. 73. Author claims, "Otis had anticipated the style of later warfare appropriate to societies with more sophisticated mass media, in which impressions back home would be as crucial as the reality of the battlefield, and in which a good public relations officer is as important as a good field commander. Press releases full of exaggerated claims were as essential to Otis as any traditional military strategy."

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 51-52. Author writes, "Perhaps Otis should have sent clippings from the *New York Times* to convince the Filipinos that they were far too ignorant and savage to run a city like Iloilo. Instead, he sent a copy of President McKinley's recent "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation, which he had just received. Miller passed it on to Lopez so that he could learn that the intention of the United States in the Philippines was to 'assert its sovereignty, that its purpose is to give them good government and security in their personal rights.' Otis neglected to tell Miller that he had politically bowdlerized the copy he had sent to Aguinaldo by removing the mention of American sovereignty over the Philippines 'to stress our benevolent purpose' and not 'offend Filipino sensibilities,' the general later explained. He substituted 'free people' for 'supremacy of the United States,' and deleted 'to exercise future domination' in the president's proclamation."

¹³⁶ Miller, p. 46.

¹³⁷ Miller, pp. 78. Author writes, "But Otis refused to listen to his own generals, he was hardly going to take advice from the enemy." Miller also provides another example of Major General Otis intolerance to disagreements by subordinates. He describes the incident when General Lawton told correspondents that the APEF needed 100,000 more troops to deal with the insurgency. Major General Otis was enraged by this contradiction and demanded General Lawton to pull back his statement. General Lawton did not. When Major General MacArthur became military governor, he requested 100,000 additional troops for he believed this was an accurate assessment of the requirement.

¹³⁸ Young, pp. 255-290.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 207. Author describes MacArthur, "As was his habit, MacArthur read everything he could find on the Filipinos and the former Spanish administrations. He placed a standing order with Kelly's, a bookseller in Hong Kong, for every book published on Far Eastern matters, particularly those devoted to colonial administration. MacArthur was a scholar and a reader, like his father before him. His passion for research and the knowledge he accumulated were two of his strongest attributes as a general." On p. 222, author continues, "No Filipino general had the battlefield experience of MacArthur, who represented the best in the U.S. military profession. He was a combat veteran, a company commander, a trainer of men, a teacher, a lawyer, an administrator, and a scholar. As commander of the 2nd Division, MacArthur applied all he had learned about soldiering in a career that extended over forty years. Inherently calm he was never impulsive or rash in his methods."

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 286. Author writes, "The general did not want Aguinaldo killed for the Filipinos had created a legend of invincibility around him, and if he were killed, millions of Filipinos would not believe he was dead. Even those who did would surely make him a martyr of the revolution. MacArthur hoped to capture Aguinaldo alive, dispel the myth of his invincibility, and end the rebellion."

¹⁴³ Gates, p. 218.

¹⁴⁴ Gates, p. 219. See also Young, p. 266.

¹⁴⁵ Young, p. 271. See also, Gates, pp. 238-240.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁴⁷ Gates, p. 212. Author writes, "From the moment he assumed command in the islands, Major General MacArthur had hoped to involve Filipinos actively in their own defense against the revolutionaries. With the contemplated withdrawal of the volunteers and his plans for a large offensive campaign, it became even more imperative that Filipinos be armed and enlisted in the American service to offset the loss of American troops."

¹⁴⁸ Sexton, pp. 247-248. In his book on p. 264, Young describes the proclamation in the following manner: "...offering amnesty to any Filipino insurgent who surrendered to U.S. forces within ninety days and swore allegiance to the government of the United States. He offered 30 Mexican dollars for surrendered rifles, and as a further enticement, guaranteed to transport any Filipino revolutionaries who surrendered anywhere in the archipelago. MacArthur also recognized the need to treat the officers of the defeated Republican

Army with dignity." See also Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Part 5 of 7 Parts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900).

¹⁴⁹ Dixon, p. 84. Presenter states, "Many accounts of the Philippine campaign have erred in giving the civil government of William Howard Taft credit for winning Filipino acceptance of American rule. In reality, although MacArthur relinquished control over the insular government to Taft in July 1901, the policies followed by the Taft government after that date were in most cases little more than a continuation of efforts initiated by the Army in the previous two and a half years. The work of the civil authorities did help bring about conciliation between Americans and Filipinos, and the lure of civil government was a powerful incentive to Filipinos who wanted to be free of the restrictions of martial rule. In fact, Taft advocated a more repressive policy of pacification than that conceived by MacArthur. Taft, not the military, pushed for the deportation of captured revolutionary leaders to Guam, and Taft, not MacArthur, wanted Filipinos refusing to lay down their arms to be treated as outlaws and subject to the severest penalties." Yet, despite this conclusion, Major General MacArthur's suspension of his own mental models saw the importance of implementing harsher measure during his tenure, at the right time to make a vital difference. Unlike Major General Otis, Major General MacArthur did not attempt to hide the shortfalls of his amnesty program and openly reported the dismal result to his superiors. (See *Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands* (Manila, 4 July 1901)). His implemented measure was expanded upon Major General Chaffee who saw the ultimate and formal declaration of Pacification of the Philippines in 1902.

¹⁵⁰ Young, p. 278.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁵² Young, p. 243.

¹⁵³ Linn, "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902," p. 93. After Major General Otis' offensive against the insurgents in the Winter of 1899, he reorganized the APEF into four departments: "Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao-Jolo - and dispersed his soldiers into some 400 posts and stations throughout the islands."

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. See also Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, p. 51.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 97-98. See also Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, pp. 42-43, and Linn, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon."

¹⁵⁷ Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, p. 43. See also MacArthur, Arthur, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, (Manila, 1900).

¹⁵⁸ Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell's speech can be found in Bell, J. Franklin, Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating Campaign Against Insurgents; and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstruction After Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippine Islands, (Batangas: Headquarters, Third Separate Brigade, 1902).

¹⁵⁹ In his article, May inaccurately gives Major General MacArthur less credit in the achievement of pacification. He writes, "Arthur MacArthur was fortunate enough to be military governor at the time of Aguinaldo's capture, but he was ineffective in eliminating guerrilla activity in the archipelago. Adna Chaffee was more vigorous in prosecuting the war, but he was also extremely tolerant of abuses and atrocities committed by soldiers under his command."

¹⁶⁰ Bell, p. 5.

¹⁶¹ See MacArthur's Annual Report, 1900. His report represents his comprehensive and systems understanding of pacifying the Philippines in light of the insurgent resistance. See also Mills, R.W. Mills concludes that the Philippine Insurrection was America's First Venture into Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). He explores the systems approach to conducting counterinsurgency through an application of the US Army's six principles of MOOTW (objective, legitimacy, security, restraint, unity of command, and perseverance). He further concludes, "The interconnectivity of the six principles of MOOTW and the need to consider them as a whole and not independently. More significantly, it will demonstrate that the principle of objective is the cornerstone from which all the other principles are derived. Without sound, clear objectives it will be impossible, just as in the Philippines, to maintain a collective unity of effort, the perseverance necessary to win, or the legitimacy required for continued

support." He proposes, "The Philippine Insurgency provides excellent venue for the study of the principles of military operations other than war." Among the four APEF commanders, only MacArthur seem to have applied and approached the pacification problem in a comprehensive systems approach, applying the principles of MOOTW so effectively.

¹⁶² Cohen and Gooch, p. 236.

¹⁶³ Sefton, James E. The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967) p. 254.

¹⁶⁴ Wesley K. Clark, "Military Contingency Operations: The Lessons of Political-Military Coordination," (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1975), p. 147-148.

¹⁶⁵ Gates, p. 64. Sarkesian also concludes in his book (p. 169), "The forces of the 8th Corps consisted of volunteers and Regulars. The Battle of Manila proved that the volunteers and Regulars in the American forces could operate effectively when led properly."

¹⁶⁶ May, p. 374. Author states, "In 1900, Americans were certainly more martially minded, more convinced that their political system was exportable, and the future was theirs."

¹⁶⁷ The most impressive examples of adaptive and generative learning which contributed to team learning can be found in Dr. Linn's doctoral work, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902.

¹⁶⁸ Hammond, J.W., Counterinsurgency: What are the key lessons learned from the success and failure of western world involvement since World War II, presents summarized planning considerations for low intensity conflict and derives lessons from an analysis of experiences of British in Malaya (1942), Americans in the Philippines (1946), French in Indochina/Algeria (1947/1956), and Americans in Vietnam (1963). Concludes the following lessons: 1) plan on unconventional war using unconventional means and tactics; 2) eliminate external support sustaining the insurgency; 3) ***make intelligence operations the primary counterinsurgency tool***; 4) take an offensive posture vice defensive; 5) the inhabitants (people) are the center of gravity in all counterinsurgency; and 6) civil action/pacification programs are equal if not more important than killing the insurgent. MacArthur seems to have known these lessons and integrated them into his strategy and policies.

¹⁶⁹ Clark, p. 148.

APPENDIX I: Timeline of Events During the Pacification of the Philippines¹

1898	21 April	Act of Congress declares a state of war with Spain
	23 April	President calls for 125,000 volunteers
	24 April	Consul E. Spencer Pratt meets with Emilio Aguinaldo
	26 April	United States declares war against Spain. Regular Army increases to 63,106 men
	1 May	Commodore Dewey's Asiatic Squadron, U.S. Navy destroys Spanish squadron in Manila Bay
	12 May	Aguinaldo arrives Philippines by U.S. Navy ship
	16 May	Major General Wesley Merritt, U.S. Army, becomes Commander of the Department of the Pacific
	24 May	Aguinaldo declares Philippines Republic independence
	25 May	President increases volunteers to 75,000
	26 May	Secretary of the Navy directs Admiral Dewey to refrain from any association with Aguinaldo's forces
	16 June	Secretary of State warns Consul Pratt any agreements made with Aguinaldo without acknowledgement from Washington are not recognized
	18 June	Aguinaldo establishes an interior civil government
	23 June	Aguinaldo declares his presidency
	30 June	First American-Philippine Expeditionary Force led by Brigadier General Anderson arrives
	26 July	Major General Merritt arrives in the Philippines
	12 August	Protocol with Spain signed at Washington, D.C.
	13 August	The APEF defeats Spanish forces entrench in and around Manila
	14 August	Major General Merritt issues his first proclamation to the Filipinos
	15 August	Civil government begins to be established

	16 August	President McKinley announces cessation of hostilities
	28 August	Major General Merritt becomes the first military governor and transfer command of VIII Army Corps to Major General E.S. Otis Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur relieves General Anderson in Command of Second Division
	29 August	Major General Otis replaces Major General Merritt and assumes the duties of military governor
	8 September	Major General Otis demands withdrawal of insurgent force from Manila
	15 September	Insurgents comply with demands
	10 December	Treaty of Paris signed between the United States and Spain President McKinley issues a proclamation of U.S. Sovereignty over the Philippines
	24 December	Insurgents take possession of Iloilo
1899	January	Aguinaldo responds with his own proclamation to resist U.S. rule and calls on his fellow Filipinos
	4 February	Philippine-American War begins
	17 March	Major General H.W. Lawton relieves General T.M. Anderson in command of the First Division
	12 April	Treaty of peace signed by the President
	October- November	Major General Otis orders an offensive against Aguinaldo's insurgents
	13 November	Aguinaldo resorts to unconventional warfare
1900	6 February	Judge William Howard Taft becomes president of the second Philippine Commission
	15 March	Major General Adna R. Chaffee, U.S.A., withdraws will all United States troops from China to the Philippines

- 29 March General Orders #38, Headquarters Army, War Department proclaimed. Orders state, "On 27 March 1900, the Division of the Philippines to comprise all the islands ceded to the United States by Spain by the Treaty of Paris, ratified April 11, 1899 is created under command of Major General Ewell Otis with headquarters at Manila Philippines." The following departments were established: Department of Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Department of Visayas, and Department of Mindanao and Jolo.
- 5 May Major General MacArthur assumes command of the APEF and duties of military governor
- 3 June Second Philippine Commission arrives
- 21 June Major General MacArthur proclaims amnesty program
- December Major General MacArthur declares martial law and initiates a military campaign to isolate the insurgents from local village support
- 1901 23 March Brigadier General Funston captures Aguinaldo
- 19 April Aguinaldo swears his allegiance to the U.S. and issues request for his followers to surrender
- 4 July Military government in the Philippines ends
- Judge Taft becomes the first civil governor of the Philippines
- Major General Adna R. Chaffee assumes command of the APEF and military governor to areas still under military government
- 1902 1 July Congress passes the Philippine Government Act
- 4 July President Theodore Roosevelt formally declares complete Pacification of the Philippines

¹ Extracted from the *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899*. Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, Part 2 of 3 Parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899; *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900*. Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Part 5 of 7 Parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900; *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901*. Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Part 4 of 4 Parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901; *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902*. Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Volume IX. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.

APPENDIX II: BIBLIOGRAPHY

AUDIO

Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization Audio Tapes* (Abridged). New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Audio Publishing, 1994.

BOOKS

Bell, J. Franklin. *Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating Campaign Against Insurgents; and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstruction After Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippine Islands*. Batangas: Headquarters, Third Separate Brigade, 1902.

Bertalanffy, Ludwig von. *General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications*. New York: George Braziller, 1968.

Chawla, Sarita and Renesch, John Renesch (editors). *Learning Organizations: Developing Cultures for Tomorrow's Workplace*. Portland: Productivity Press, 1995.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Everyman's Library, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.

Cohen, Eliot A. and Gooch, John. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.

Cooper, Matthew. *The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure*. Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1978.

Czerwinski, Tom. *Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1998.

Dixon, J.C. *The American Military and the Far East Proceedings of The Ninth Military*. United States Air Force Academy, 1980.

Drucker, Peter F. "The New Society of Organizations," in Robert Howard and Robert D. Haas, *The Learning Imperative: Managing People for Continuous Innovation*. Boston: Harvard Business Review, 1990.

Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N. *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present*, Fourth Edition. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.

- Elliott, Euel W., and L. Douglas Kiel. *Nonlinear Dynamics, Complexity and Public Policy*. Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1999.
- English, John A. *Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.
- Faust, Karl Irving. *Campaigning in the Philippines*. San Francisco: Hicks-Judd, 1899.
- Funston, Frederick. *Memories of Two Wars: Cuban and Philippine Experiences*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1911.
- Gates, John Morgan. *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1973.
- Gleick, James. *Chaos: Making a New Science*. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin, 1988.
- Howard, Robert (editor). *The Learning Imperative: Managing People for Continuous Innovation*. Boston: Harvard Business Review, 1990.
- Kelly, Kevin. *Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-biological Civilization*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1994.
- Karnow, Stanley. *In Our Image*. New York: Random House, 1989.
- Kiel, L. Douglas. *Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal*. 1st ed, *The Jossey-Bass public administration series*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994.
- Kiel, L. Douglas, and Euel W. Elliott. *Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
- Le Roy, James Alfred. *Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation, With an Introductory Account of the Spanish Rule*. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1914.
- Leech, Margaret. *In the Days of McKinley*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.
- Linn, Brian McAllister. *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
- MacArthur, Douglas A., General. *Reminiscences*. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985- a reprint of New York: McGraw Hill, 1964 publication of *Reminiscences*.
- Marquardt, Michael J. *Building the Learning Organization: A Systems Approach to Quantum Improvement and Global Success*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996.

- May, Glenn A. *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- Miller, Stuart Creighton. *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Morgan, Wayne. *William McKinley and His America*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
- Sanders, Irene T. *Strategic Thinking and the New Science: Planning in the Midst of Chaos, Complexity, and Change*. New York: Free Press, 1998.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. *American's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.
- Sefton, James E. *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.
- Senge, Peter M. *The Dance of Change: The Challenges of Sustaining Momentum in Learning Organizations*. New York: Currency/Doubleday, 1999.
- Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization*. New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994.
- Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990.
- Sexton, William Thaddeus. *Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism*. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.
- Taylor, John Rodgers Meigs. *Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1903.
- Waldrop, M. Mitchell. *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
- Welch, Richard E. *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
- Wildman, Edwin. *Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino Ambitions*. Boston: Lothrop Publisher Company, 1914.
- Williams, Garnett P. *Chaos Theory Tamed*. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 1997.

Yon, Kenneth Ray. *The General's General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur, History and Warfare*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.

INTERNET SOURCES

Shinseki, Eric K., General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War." Available online: 30 November 1999. [<http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/vision.htm>]

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Bacevich, Andrew J. Jr. "Disagreeable Work: Pacifying the Moros, 1903-1906." *Military Review* 62, no. 6 (1982): 49-61.

Birtle, Andrew J. "The U.S. Army's Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900-April 1901." *Journal of Military History* 61, no. 2 (1997): 255-282.

Diokno, Maria Serena I. "Perspectives on Peace During the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902." *Southeast Asia Research [Great Britain]* 5, no. 1 (1997): 5-19.

Echevarria, Antulio J. II. "Optimizing Chaos on the Nonlinear Battlefield." *Military Review* 77, no. 5 (1997): 27-33.

Fulmer, Robert M. "A Conversation with Peter Senge: New Developments in Organizational Learning." *Organizational Dynamics*, Autumn 1998, 33-43.

Karch, Lawrence G. "Chaos Theory and the (Marine) Corps." *Maine Corps Gazette* 77, no. 4 (1993 Apr): 57-58.

Kohler, David R. "Our First Southeast Asian War." *American History Illustrated* 24, no. 7 (1990): 18-31.

Linn, Brian M. "Guerrilla Fighter: Frederick Funston in the Philippines." *Kansas History* 10, no. 1 (1987): 2-16.

Linn, Brian M. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." *Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 6, no. 1 (1991): 90-114.

Linn, Brian M. "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines. 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon." *Military Affairs* (1987): 62-66.

May, Glenn A. "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902." *Pacific Historical Review* 52, no. 4 (1983): 353-377.

Nicholls, David. "What does Chaos Theory Mean for Warfare?" *Airpower Journal* 8, no. 3 (1994 Fall): 46-57.

Reed, John S. "External Discipline During Counterinsurgency: A Philippine War Case Study, 1900-1901." *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4, no. 1 (1995): 29-48.

THESIS/MONOGRAPH

Aldridge, Brian G. "Drive Them Until They Drop and Then Civilize Them." Masters of Arts Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1993.

Bunker, Robert J. "Five-Dimensional (Cyber) Warfighting: Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies?" United States Army War College, 1998.

Clark, Wesley K. "Military Contingency Operations: The Lessons of Political-Military Coordination." MMAS, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.

Early, Gerald H. "The United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902." MMAS, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.

Glenn, Harry C. III. "Building the Tactical Nerve Center: Enhancing Battalion Commander and Staff Performance in the Tactical Decision Making Process," Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.

Gorman, G. Scott. "Adapting to Chaos: American Soldiers in Siberia, 1918-1920," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS], United States Army Command and General Staff College [USACGSC], 1998.

Gumbert, Jack L. II. "Learning Organizations and Operational-Level Leadership," Monograph, 1996.

Hammond, J.W. "Counterinsurgency: What are the Key Lessons Learned from the Success and Failure of Western World Involvement Since World War II," Naval War College, 1992.

James, Glenn E. "Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications," Naval War College, 1996.

Jensen. "Some Lessons From the Philippine War (1898-1902)," United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1987.

- Jorgensen, Julius J. Jr. "Historical Analysis of the United States Army: 1898 to 1916," United States Army War College, 1972.
- Marple, Allan D. "The Philippine Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, The Philippine Islands, 1899." MMAS, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1983.
- Matthews, Lloyd J., and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?* Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 1998.
- McCorry, D. Jr. "Third Wave Military Acquisition, Organizational and Management Considerations for a Complex System," Naval War College, 1995.
- Miles, Marion L. Jr. "Fighting Without Boundaries: Unleashing Initiative on the Tactical Battlefield." Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.
- Mills, R. "The Philippine Insurrection: America's First Venture into Military," Naval War College, 1997.
- Prosser, Brian D. "The Need for Training for Uncertainty," Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
- Reed, John S. "Burden and Honor: The United States Volunteers in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1901," University of Southern California, 1994.
- Stewart, Jacque J. "The U.S. Government and the Apache Indians, 1871-1876: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency." MMAS, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899.* Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, Part 2 of 3 Parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.
- Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900.* Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Part 5 of 7 Parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900.
- Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901.* Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Part 4 of 4 Parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901.

Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902. Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Volume IX. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.

Bond, Brian. "Battle of France," from Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air, edited by Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (New York: David McKay Co., 1976), pp. 101-113, reprinted in USACGSC, *C600 Terms II and III Syllabus/Book of Readings* (For Leavenworth: USACGSC, AY 1998-1999).

Lewis, S.J. "Reflections on German Military Reform," in Military Review 68 (August 1988): 60-69; reprinted in USACGSC, *C600 Terms II and III Syllabus/Book of Readings*. For Leavenworth: USACGSC, AY 1998-1999.

Linn, Brian M. "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," *Military Affairs* (April 1987):62-66. Copyright at 1987 by the American Military Institute. Reproduced in USACGSC, *C600 Terms I Syllabus/Book of Readings*. For Leavenworth: USACGSC, AY 1999.

MacArthur, Arthur. *Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands*. Manila, 1900.

MacArthur, Arthur. *Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands*. Manila, 4 July 1901.

Ross, Steven T. "Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare," in the Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987, edited by Harry R. Borowski (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1988), 309-24; excerpt reprinted in USACGSC, *C600 Part I Syllabus/Book of Readings* (For Leavenworth: USACGSC, July 1998).

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*. Fort Monroe, VA: United States TRADOC, 1 August 1994.

United States Adjutant-General's Office. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain and Conditions Growing Out of the Same: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands, from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902*. Volume 1. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1902.

United States Adjutant-General's Office. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief*

Expedition, April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902. Volume 2. Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1993.

United States Army Field Manual 22-100: *Army Leadership*. Washington: HQ, Department of the Army, 1999.

United States Army Field Manual 100-5: *Operations*. Washington: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993.

United States National Archives. *History of the Philippine Insurrection Against the United States [microfilm], 1899-1903: and Documents Relating to the War Department Project for Publishing the History*. Washington: National Archives, 1968.